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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
SECOND-ORDER DEVOLUTION, BUREAUCRATIC DISCRETION AND THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY 
FAMILIES PROGRAM 
 
 
 
The passage of PRWORA in 1996 gave states the opportunity to engage in second-
order devolution (SOD), which allows local governments to exercise more discretionary 
power in the implementation of welfare policies. Currently 14 states have engaged in 
significant SOD, with a number of other states practicing SOD to a lesser degree. Given 
this trend in TANF administration, it is important to explore if and how SOD affects the 
implementation of TANF work sanctions and work-related policies.  
Opponents of welfare decentralization insist SOD may lead to a ‘race to the bottom’ in 
welfare generosity to avoid the immigration of the poor, the loss of business revenue, and 
financial burden due to fiscal relationship, while proponents of welfare decentralization 
insist that local governments better understand the needs of the poor and are therefore 
better able to provide more appropriate services to their welfare clients, thus improving 
program performance. Existing scholarship on SOD under TANF has focused on the 
increase in discretion to local government, and how this may enhance variation in policy 
outcomes or contribute to policy success or stringency across local jurisdictions (Cho et 
al. 2005 ; Fording, Soss and Schram 2007). However, these studies are limited by the fact 
that they examine a single state. To date there has been no systematic analysis of the 
impact of administrative structure on the implementation of welfare policy which 
compares centralized states with SOD states.  
In this dissertation, I conduct an analysis of the effects of SOD across the states by 
exploring how differences in administrative structure due to SOD affect different 
implementation outcomes. First, I examine the impact of SOD on the implementation of 
TANF work sanctions, using individual-level administrative data combined with county 
level data. Second, I examine the impact of SOD on TANF work sanctions, caseload 
decline, and several work-related TANF outcomes with state-level data. Multilevel 
analysis and OLS with panel corrected errors are applied for the analyses. Specifically, I 
test the conventional wisdom that success and punitiveness in policy implementation is 
enhanced in second-order devolution states, compared to centralized states, due to 
increased discretion granted to local governments in SOD states.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act (PRWORA) in 1996 has resulted in a significant transfer of authority and 
responsibility for establishing and implementing welfare policies from the federal 
government to state governments, a process which is known as first-order devolution. 
However, scholars have increasingly begun to recognize that in designing their new 
welfare systems under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 
programs, many states have engaged in second-order devolution by shifting important 
policy making discretion further downward to local governments (Whitaker and Time 
2001; Gainsbrough 2003). Currently, fourteen states devolve significant authority and 
responsibility within the TANF program to local jurisdictions.1 Thus, it is important 
to explore whether SOD affects the implementation of welfare policy, and if so, how.  
SOD potentially influences the implementation of TANF through the discretionary 
power of local administrators and case managers. SOD allows more discretionary 
power2, which is shaped by local environments to local administrators and case 
 
                                                                                                                                  
1Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New 
York, North Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Tennessee, Utah, and Wisconsin devolve authority 
and responsibility in designing and implementing welfare policies to local 
governments or regional boards. 
 
2Past research has shown that bureaucrats play an important role in the policy 
process. Street-level bureaucrats are especially important in the implementation 
process because they directly interact with clients in the course of their jobs and 
execute a significant amount of discretionary power in their decision-making (Lipsky 
1980; Grubb 1984; Weissert 1994; Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2000; Keiser et al 
2004; Riccucci 2005; Fording et al 2006; 2007). However, previous researches have 
not thoroughly addressed how local community characteristics affect the decision-
making of local administrators and street-level bureaucrats. The prerequisite question 
addressed in this dissertation, therefore, is how SOD which allows more discretionary 
power to local governments influences the implementation of welfare policies through 
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managers by transferring authority and responsibility in designing and implementing 
welfare policies.  
As with first-order devolution, the practice of second-order devolution under 
TANF has been the subject of debate. Proponents of welfare decentralization insist 
that local governments better understand the needs of the poor, along with the social 
and economic environments that surround them, and are therefore better able to 
provide more appropriate services to their welfare clients, thus improving program 
performance. However, opponents argue that decentralization to the local level may 
lead to a “race to the bottom,” much as is claimed to have occurred at the state level 
with respect to AFDC and TANF benefit levels, due to the actual or perceived need by 
local officials to avoid the immigration of the poor and the loss of business revenue 
(Bailey and Rom 2004; Peterson and Rom 1989).  Rather than affecting benefit 
levels, for which state governments still remain responsible, SOD may lead to stricter 
TANF implementation among local governments within SOD states. This possibility 
may be enhanced due to the fiscal relationship between states and local implementing 
jurisdictions in SOD states3.  
Existing scholarship on SOD under TANF has focused on the increase in discretion 
to local government, and how this may enhance variation in policy outcomes or 
contribute to policy success or stringency across local jurisdictions (Cho et al. 2005 ; 
Fording, Soss and Schram 2007). However, these studies are limited by the fact that 
they examine a single state. To date there has been no systematic analysis of the 
impact of administrative structure on the implementation of welfare policy which 
 
                                                 
discretionary power of local administrators and case managers, which is shaped by 
local environments (Keiser et al 2004; Riccucci 2005; Fording et al 2006; 2007).  
 
 3Block grant and bonus for welfare saving. 
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compares centralized states with SOD states. In this dissertation, I conduct an analysis 
of the effects of SOD across the states by exploring how differences in administrative 
structure due to SOD affect the implementation of three categories of important TANF 
outcomes often addressed in the welfare literature – sanctions for noncompliance with 
TANF work requirements, employment-related outcomes, and TANF caseload decline.  
This research project proceeds in three parts. First, to test the impact of informal 
discretion on the implementation of policy, I examine welfare implementation in the 
states in which welfare administration is relatively centralized at the state level, with 
very little discretion given to local governments. Presumably, local administrators and 
case managers implement welfare policy following the intentions and the rules of the 
states because centralized states do not grant authority and responsibility in designing 
and implementing welfare policies to local governments. In other words, there is 
relatively little room for local and street-level bureaucrats to execute their formal 
discretion in the implementation process. Yet, several studies present evidence 
demonstrating that variation in local characteristics promotes variation in policy 
outcomes across counties, even within states with highly centralized administrative 
structures through the inherent discretionary power of local bureaucrats (Grubb 1984; 
Weissert 1994; Keiser et al 2004). This implies that the informal discretionary power 
of local administrators and case managers influences the implementation of policy. To 
examine the impact of informal discretion on welfare implementation in highly 
centralized states, I test the impact of local characteristics on the implementation of 
TANF sanction policy in twenty two centralized states while controlling for client-
level characteristics.  
Second, welfare reform in 1996 allowed states to grant authority and responsibility 
to local governments or regional boards. Currently, eight states devolve significant 
authority and responsibility in designing and implementing their welfare programs to 
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local governments, and six states devolve similar responsibility to local or regional 
boards composed of local administrators, private organizations, community 
representatives, and members of the local business community (Gainsbrough 2003). 
In brief, counties in second-order devolution states often have substantial power over 
welfare spending and other aspects of these programs including work requirements, 
time limits, and sanctions. In counties within SOD states, local governments have 
more authority, which allows local administrators and case managers to exercise 
greater discretionary power in the implementation of policy.  
One study explores the impacts of local characteristics on sanction policy through 
the discretionary power of local administrators and case managers in a SOD state 
(Fording et al 2007). The authors argue that local characteristics influence the 
implementation of policy through the increased discretionary power of local 
administrators and case managers due to second-order devolution. Although many 
scholars insist that SOD gives more discretion to local governments, which should 
therefore produce more variation in policy outcomes across counties, no study has yet 
explored the impacts of administrative structure on the implementation of welfare 
policy by comparing centralized states with SOD states. Thus, I test the impact of 
administrative structure on the implementation of policy by comparing centralized 
states with the states that have engaged in significant SOD. Specially, I examine two 
hypotheses: the sanction variation and sanction stringency hypotheses.  
The sanction variation hypothesis posits that the effect of local characteristics on 
sanction policy outcomes across counties is stronger within SOD states than it is 
within centralized states due to the increased discretionary power of local bureaucrats. 
The effects of local context will be greater in states that devolve authority and 
responsibility (both formal and informal discretion) to local governments or regional 
boards than in states that administer sanction policy directly (only informal) because 
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local administrators and case managers have more discretion in SOD states than those 
in centralized states. If the sanction variation hypothesis is correct (giving more 
authority allows local governments to enjoy more discretionary power), the impact of 
local characteristics on the implementation of policy in SOD states should be greater 
than that observed in centralized states after controlling for individual level-
characteristics. If not, this suggests that SOD does not matter a great deal in the 
implementation of policy because the discretionary power of local administrators and 
case managers is inherent in the nature of their jobs.  
The sanction stringency hypothesis implies that sanction rates in SOD states will 
be higher than those in centralized states due to potential financial constraint, political 
pressure, and competition across counties. Due to SOD, counties in SOD states such 
as Ohio and Colorado receive block grants from states and the authority to establish 
many important details of their welfare programs, including work requirements, time 
limits, sanctions, and good cause exemption rules. The adoption of block grants may 
create pressure to reduce welfare spending because the county must pay 100% of each 
dollar of welfare costs beyond the state contribution (Brueckner 2000)4. In this way, 
block grants may act as a financial burden for counties that are responsible for the all 
of the spending when the welfare caseload increases beyond a certain threshold. 
Hence, counties with SOD are likely to adopt stricter TANF policies and implement 
policies more strictly to reduce the potential financial burden. Political pressure and 
 
                                                                                                                                  
4 Block grants may not be an actual constraint for counties to maintain or increase 
welfare spending because the caseload declined significantly since the 1996 welfare 
reform, and states and counties were still getting the same amount of money from 
higher levels of government. But the block grant itself may provide incentives for 
local administrators and case managers to maintain the welfare rolls at the status quo 
in SOD states, due to anticipated welfare savings. 
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competition among counties provides a possible alternative explanation as to why 
counties may implement sanctions more strictly, as they may wish to avoid the 
immigration of the poor and the loss of business.  
Third, I examine the impact of SOD on state-level TANF outcomes to consider its 
effect on policy success and punitiveness of TANF programs, and to provide 
additional evidence of its effect on sanction stringency. Supporters and critics have 
their own arguments concerning the impact of SOD in policy implementation. 
Supporters argue SOD enables frontline workers to deliver more appropriate services 
to the clients in their constituency, while critics argue SOD induces a race to the 
bottom in the implementation process. To test these competing theses, caseload 
decline, work sanctions, and three employment outcomes are considered as dependent 
variables to examine policy success and punitiveness of TANF programs. I first test 
the impact of SOD on caseload decline to determine the impact of administrative 
structure on the implementation of TANF. After establishing that SOD experienced a 
greater decline in their caseloads in the post-reform era, I test two hypotheses to 
determine the causal mechanisms influencing caseload decline. First, I test the 
sanction stringency hypothesis (with state-level data) to determine if sanctioning rates 
are higher in SOD states than in centralized states, and therefore if administrative 
structure influences the implementation of sanction policy. Second, I test the 
employment improvement hypothesis to determine if welfare exit rates through 
employment, job retention rate, and earnings gain are higher in SOD states than 
centralized states (and therefore if administrative structure influences the 
implementation of employment-related policies).  
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Plan for the dissertation 
Considerable research has been conducted on the subject of TANF sanctions, 
though most of those focus on similar topics5. Only two studies explore how the local 
environment influences the implementation of TANF work sanctions through the 
discretionary power of local administrators and case managers, and only three studies 
directly examine the potential effects of SOD on TANF implementation6. Despite 
these studies, as I discuss in more detail below, there has been no systematic study of 
how administrative structure (SOD) influences the implementation of policies by 
allowing more room for discretionary power to local bureaucrats.  
In Chapter One, I begin with a theoretical review of the role of bureaucrats in 
delivering services to the clients, the nature of bureaucratic discretion, which is 
inevitable for local street-level bureaucrats in their decision-making in the 
implementation process, and the impact of administrative structure (second-order 
devolution) which allows a significant transfer of authority for designing and 
implementing welfare policies from state governments to local governments. In 
Chapter Two, I then offer a number of hypotheses concerning the factors (including 
SOD) which should affect how the discretion of local bureaucrats is used in the 
 
                                                                                                                                  
 5These include the measurement of sanction rates across states or counties, the 
number of families sanctioned for failure to comply with work requirements, the role 
of sanctions in caseload decline, the individual and family characteristics of 
sanctioned people, the obstacles to comply with work requirements or to find 
employment, and the well-being of sanctioned people who left welfare. 
 
 6Among these five, one studies a centralized state, Missouri (Keiser et al 2004), 
another studies a second-order devolution state, Florida (Fording et al 2007), the other 
two study a SOD state, North Carolina (Cho et al 2005; Kelleher and Yackee 2004), 
and the last studies SOD states: California, Colorado and Ohio (Beller 2005). Four of 
these studies focus on only a single state and one focuses on three SOD states.  
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implementation process. 
In Chapter Three, I provide background on welfare reform, the role of sanctions 
under welfare reform and the logic of sanctioning. I also provide a literature review 
on sanctions which documents how sanctions (my main dependent variable) have 
been studied so far. 
In Chapter Four, I begin my empirical analysis by examining how bureaucratic 
discretion, conditioned by centralization (SOD) influences the implementation of 
TANF sanctioning with individual-level data combined with county-level data. First, I 
test the effect of local contexts on sanctioning in centralized (non-SOD) states in 
order to explore the impact of informal discretion on the implementation of policies. 
Then I test the effect of SOD on sanctioning by comparing SOD with non-SOD states 
by applying several statistical approaches in order to explore how SOD might 
influence the implementation of sanctioning.  
In Chapter Five, I present the results of the individual-level analyses and discuss 
what the results imply. In Chapter Six, I test the effect of SOD on policy success and 
punitiveness of TANF programs by considering caseload decline, sanctioning, and 
three employment-related policies with state-level data. Finally, in Chapter Seven, I 
summarize the findings and discuss their policy implications. I also consider what this 
research contributes to the public policy literature and to the political science 
literature more broadly. I conclude by discussing the direction of future study. 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Byungkyu Kim 2008
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Chapter 2: Bureaucratic Discretion, Administrative Centralization (SOD), and 
Policy Implementation 
 
I. Discretion and Policy Implementation 
Before discussing second-order devolution, I begin with a more general discussion 
of the impact of bureaucratic discretion in the implementation process. Bureaucrats 
play an important role in the policy process because they are responsible for 
administering and implementing the majority of governmental decisions. They 
influence decision-making due to their knowledge, expertise, and unusually long-term 
career experience, unlike other actors in political system (Schneider and Jacoby 1996). 
Street-level bureaucrats can play an especially important role in the 
implementation of welfare policy because they are largely responsible for delivering 
welfare services, client assessment, and have considerable discretion beyond the 
principal’s supervision and monitoring (Lipsky 1980; Weissert 1994). In other words, 
street-level bureaucrats have considerable leeway in determining various decisions in 
the process of policy implementation (Riccucci 2005). 
 
i. Case Manager Discretion 
Before discussing the discretion of case managers, I briefly discuss the role of 
local administrators. Their main role is the supervising and monitoring of the 
activities of frontline workers (including case managers in many cases) to follow a 
policy goal. Some studies find that leadership and the role of supervisors can 
influence the behavior of social workers. In contrast, other studies are more 
pessimistic about the positive role of supervisors (Riccucci et al 2004). In their 
activities, case managers are influenced by their colleagues and clients rather than 
supervisors, and supervisors influence case managers in a minor way (Brehm and 
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Gates 2002). Case managers also influence local administrators. Hence, regardless of 
their position and role in a local office, I assume that characteristics of their local 
environments (including case managers) also influence local administrators. Fording 
et al (2006) also argue political characteristics of local environments affect policy 
outcomes through case managers, local policy makers, and advocacy groups. Thus, I 
assume that some combination of local policy makers, local administrators, advocacy 
groups and case managers may affect the exercise of local discretion7. 
 Due to the nature of their jobs, case managers as front line workers in welfare 
services have a great amount of discretionary power in the implementation process. 
They confront a variety of complex and unpredictable problems and situations in 
delivering services. For example, case managers may investigate a client who violated 
work requirements and could potentially conclude that other problems, such as threats 
to the client from a boyfriend, child abuse, a lack of child care, or transportation 
issues may be the cause for non-compliance. In this way, case managers always 
confront a variety of complex and unpredictable situations. They confront not only 
complex and unpredictable problems, but the problems themselves are intractable, and 
emotional. In the middle of these situations, case managers assess the situation and 
decide how they will handle a client’s problem, which problem will be dealt with and 
who should be involved (Vinzant and Crothers 1998). In the course of decision-
making, rules may or may not give the guidelines case managers should follow, nor 
can the law provide the guideline for every situation (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 
2000). Thus, the decisions of case managers are influenced by community values, 
their superiors, and their own values. Hence, social street-level bureaucrats create 
 
                                                                                                                                  
7 The term ‘bureaucratic discretion’ or ‘discretionary power’ through this 
dissertation also implies local discretion in a broad sense. 
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policy through its implementation process (Keiser and Soss 1998; Keiser 1999; 
Lipsky 1980). 
The use of discretion by street-level bureaucrats may have positive and negative 
effects on the implementation of policy. If discretion is used by street-level 
bureaucrats to respond to clients’ needs and to better understand clients’ situations, 
welfare services are provided to clients at a high rate. In contrast, if case managers use 
discretion to decrease high caseloads due to resource shortages, to ignore proper 
procedures due to a lack of time, or to treat clients unequally due to their own values, 
the use of discretion results in inequality. Ultimately, clients who really need the help 
may be denied by the use of discretion (Lipsky 1980; Keiser and Soss 1998; Keiser 
1999).  
To constrain the misuse of discretion, several tools are used: supervision, 
administrative rules, and clients (Fording et al 2006)8. Supervision seems to be a weak 
constraint because supervisors have less information than case managers, they do not 
know the preferences or personal values of case workers, and they cannot determine 
case managers’ activities (Brehm and Gates 2002). Case managers confront a variety 
of complex and an unpredictable situations that are necessary to their judgments in the 
course of their jobs and may not make decisions following a supervisor’s a prior 
directives (Vinzant and Crothers 1998; Fording et al 2006). A supervisor’s capacity to 
monitor the activities of case managers by rewarding and punishing them may 
therefore work in a very limited way. The relationship with other peer case managers 
and clients may be more effective in monitoring the activities of case managers 
(Brehm and Gates 2002).  
 
                                                                                                                                  
8 For example, clients can request a hearing against a denial or termination of cash 
assistance to the local office. 
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Administrative rules are another constraint to restrict misuse of discretion. But 
rules do not regulate every situation. Hence, street-level bureaucrats exercise 
significant discretion and are often unconstrained by rules, procedures, and law. 
Clients are also a weak constraint on the use of discretion by street-level bureaucrats. 
Although street-level bureaucrats are somewhat constrained by the demands of 
recipients and citizen groups (Lipsky 1980), their relationships are not equal because 
case managers have the power to decide whether clients receive benefits or not, and in 
some cases, whether to impose sanctions or not (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2000).  
In brief, constraints such as supervision, administrative rules, and clients are too 
weak to check or guide discretion of street-level bureaucrats. Their discretion is 
inevitable in the implementation process because of the nature of their work. In this 
situation, inevitable discretion gives rise to additional concern when authority and 
responsibility for implementing welfare policy is given to local governments. If the 
use of discretionary power varies across local governments, this variation may 
produce inequity in welfare outcomes; there is a possibility that certain types of 
recipients sanctioned in county A will not get sanctioned in county B (Keiser and Soss 
1998; Keiser 1999).  
There are several empirical studies which find that discretion of street-level 
bureaucrats produces variation in policy implementation across counties even within a 
highly centralized state (Grubb 1984; Weissert 1994; Keiser et al 2004; Riccucci 
2005) and across counties within a decentralized SOD state (Fording et al 2006; 
2007) 9 . However, only three studies explore how discretion influences the 
 
                                                                                                                                  
9 Grubb (1984) found variation in welfare programs across counties in Texas, and 
argued this was caused by differences in the practice of local offices due to discretion. 
Weissert (1994) found variation in Medicaid spending and enrollment among the poor 
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implementation of TANF sanctions (i.e. penalties for noncompliance with TANF 
rules; see next chapter). One of these studies examines a highly centralized state, 
Missouri (Keiser et al 2004). The other studies examine sanctioning in a SOD state, 
Florida (Fording et al 2006; 2007). To date, no one has compared how sanctions are 
implemented under different administrative structures and how the degree of 
decentralization influences the implementation of TANF sanctions. This is a 
significant weakness in the sanctions literature because under TANF, local 
administrators and case managers may exercise a significant amount of discretionary 
power in the implementation process (Pavetti et al 2003). Case managers have the 
authority to impose sanctions or not to do so. In the implementation process, many 
factors such as their personal values, client characteristics which might influence 
behavior and community environments may affect their decisions when case 
managers apply sanction rules. I expect that regardless of the level of administrative 
centralization, there exists significant variation in the implementation of sanction 
outcomes across counties due to the discretionary power of local administrators and 
case managers. In addition, I expect this discretion is shaped by local environments10. 
 
 
                                                 
across counties, and argued office managers’ responsiveness and attitudes, and the 
county environment matter in explaining variation. Keiser et al (2004) found racial 
context in a local area affects how sanction policy is implemented by influencing 
street-level bureaucrats. Riccucci (2005) found variation in street-level bureaucrats’ 
perceptions concerning welfare priorities across the three counties within Michigan, 
despite the fact that Michigan’s welfare system is highly centralized. This result is 
evidence of the discretionary power of street-level bureaucrats and how it influences 
the implementation of public policy, as well as the fact that state or agency officials 
often have little influence over the practice of street-level bureaucrats. 
10 Similar to past studies, I assume bureaucratic discretion is shaped by the local 
environments in which bureaucrats work (Keiser et al 2004; Fording et al 2007). 
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II. Administrative Centralization (First and Second-Order Devolution) 
The degree of administrative centralization has been a prominent issue since 
PROWRA was passed in 1996 due to the fact that it gives more discretion to state 
governments in designing and administering TANF (first-order devolution), and then 
allows states to transfer significant (second-order devolution) discretion to local 
governments. In this dissertation, I explore the impact of administrative centralization 
on policy outcomes by studying its impact on the implementation of TANF sanction 
policies and other TANF outcomes. Although a lot of studies have been conducted on 
TANF and TANF sanction policy11, no one study has investigated the question that 
how administrative centralization, especially second-order devolution, impacts the 
implementation of sanction policy since the 1996 welfare reform. 
 
i. Centralization vs. Decentralization 
As American governments become bigger to handle the growing demand of 
populations, they share authority and responsibility with other levels of governments 
(Kettl, 2000; Agranoff and Mcguire, 2001). In redistributive policy, the question of 
which government is better able to provide welfare services has been one of the more 
prominent debates since the passage of PROWRA in 1996 because the federal 
government gives more discretion to state governments in designing and 
implementing welfare policies. Proponents of devolution argue that the problems and 
the demands of constituencies vary by states and are conditioned by their own 
environments. Therefore, it is hard for the federal government to identify the 
problems and needs of a state to build policies meeting a state’s own demands. States 
 
                                                                                                                                  
11I discuss details of the sanction literature in chapter 3. 
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need the flexibility given by decentralization (devolution) because they better 
understand their own problems, the demands of their residents, as well as the 
socioeconomic environments surrounding them. Therefore, proponents of devolution 
argue that states can provide more appropriate services by maximizing the use of their 
own resources (Whitaker and Time, 2001; Dye, 1990). 
On the other hand, opponents of devolution argue that giving more discretion and 
responsibility to state or local governments in welfare policy design and 
implementation may result in a race to the bottom phenomenon. This is because state 
or local governments compete to reduce welfare generosity in benefit levels, 
eligibility, sanctions, and so on, to avoid the immigration of the poor and the loss of 
business revenue. Thus, devolution may lead to more punitive treatment of clients 
across jurisdictions. Many studies have investigated inter-state competition and the 
race to the bottom at the state level, and although there is some disagreement 
concerning the magnitude of the effect, most studies find some evidence of a race to 
the bottom (Peterson and Rom 1989; Enchautegui 1997; Kolpin, Figlio, and Reid 
1999; Volden 2002; Berry, Fording and Hanson 2003; Bailey and Rom 2004; Bailey 
2005) 12. If the race to the bottom works as insisted without concern for the well-
being of welfare beneficiaries, devolution may result in an undesired outcome.   
Both supporters and opponents of devolution predicted that granting more 
discretion and responsibility to state governments would result in second-order 
devolution (Whitaker and Time 2001; Gainsborough 2003). But how has this affected 
policy outcomes? The academic literature suggests that local factors affect policy 
 
                                                                                                                                  
 12Fransis (1998) argues states act independently to address the need of their 
welfare populations instead they follow the same pattern such as concurrent cutting of 
benefits due to federal competition and the mobility of the poor and business. 
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outcomes more strongly in a decentralized structure because first-order devolution 
increases state discretion and second-order devolution increases county discretion 
(Francis, 1998). In other words, local factors should produce more variation in policy 
outcomes both across states and within states through increased discretion because 
local factors are different from state to state and county to county. As discussed above, 
SOD also may induce a RTB in policies among local jurisdictions to avoid the 
immigration of the poor and the loss of business revenue. 
In addition to providing more variation, there is reason to expect that TANF 
implementation may take a fundamentally different form in SOD states as well. 
Despite the potential significance of SOD under welfare reform, only a few studies 
directly examine the potential effects of SOD on TANF implementation. Both Cho et 
al. (2005) and Kelleher and Yackee (2004) examine the potential beneficial impact of 
SOD on TANF implementation in North Carolina. This state provides a unique 
opportunity evaluate SOD due to the fact that in North Carolina, counties had the 
option to design their own TANF program, or to rely on the state plan. The results of 
these two studies provide mixed support for the benefits of SOD. Although county 
officials in SOD counties were more likely to perceive that TANF implementation 
was effective (Cho et al. 2005; Kelleher and Yackee 2004), comparisons between 
SOD and non-SOD counties on objective measures of program success were much 
less conclusive (Kelleher and Yackee 2004). Finally, Beller (2005) examines the 
impact of SOD on TANF policies in California, Colorado and Ohio. Contrary to 
expectations, she finds SOD does not produce more conservative policies and that to 
the extent that counties within SOD states vary in their policy choices, this variation is 
essentially random with respect to traditional determinants of state policy choices (e.g. 
socioeconomic and political variables).. 
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ii. Second-Order Devolution 
The Merriam Webster dictionary defines ‘devolution’ as “transference of (as rights, 
powers, property or responsibility) to another; especially: the surrender of powers to 
local authorities by a central government”. Though many studies and debates have 
focused on first-order devolution, relatively few studies have examined second-order 
devolution (Gainsbrough 2003; Fording et al 2006) 13. Despite its association with 
welfare reform, it is important to note that second-order devolution existed prior to 
welfare reform under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program 
in the administration of welfare policy14. Fifteen states administered the AFDC 
program locally and thirty-five states administered AFDC at the state level 
(Gainsbrough 2003). Under TANF, states have the option to grant administrative 
authority and responsibility to local governments as the federal government grants 
authority and responsibility to state governments in designing and implementing 
welfare policy (Nathan 1997; Adkisson 1998). Due to the passage of PROWRA in 
1996, second-order devolution accelerated (Fording et al 2007).  
 
                                                                                                                                  
 13Although Gainsbrough (2003) explores which state devolves the authority to 
local government at which degree and Fording et al (2006) explore how variation in 
local community affects the implementation of sanction process in Florida which 
second-order devolution occurs, no one has studied the effect of community variations 
on policy implementation process through the discretion of local administrators and 
case managers by comparing state administered sanction policy to county 
administered sanction policy to catch up impact of administrative structure on policy 
implementation. 
  
 14Under AFDC, states could choose between state administration and state-
supervised administration. The former indicated that the state administered the policy 
directly while the latter indicated that local governments administered the policy 
under the supervision of a statewide welfare agency. However, federal funds were 
given to state governments and states had the responsibility to insure that the policy 
was administered according to federal guidelines under both structures (Adkisson, 
1998).  
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Among the fifteen states that administered AFDC locally, seven states seem to 
have changed little in the division of authority between states and localities. These 
localities serve as functional administrative tools of states with little or no discretion. 
On the other hand, eight of the fifteen states grant significant authority and 
responsibility to localities under TANF: California, Colorado, Maryland, Minnesota, 
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, and Wisconsin (Pandey and Collier-Tenison 2001; 
Gainsbrough 2003).  
In California, although the state government determines eligibility and benefits, 
counties were given more opportunities to decide rules of the program concerning the 
extension of time limits, the extension of the period for job search activities, the 
number of required work hours, and exemptions from work requirements. In Colorado, 
counties receive block grants from the state and the state requires a Maintenance of 
Effort (MOE) for counties. Counties also have a great deal of discretion in deciding 
other aspects of the program-particularly work requirements. In Maryland, counties 
are responsible for assessing applicants for additional or alternative benefits including 
welfare avoidance grants, child care and, medical assistance, and local governments 
influence in the state process by submitting the candidate list of local directors of 
social services. They are also rewarded for savings in their welfare program. In 
Minnesota, counties determine education and training services, and case management 
strategies including sanctions policies and time limits. Counties also requested cuts in 
relatively high benefits which could make it difficult to meet stricter TANF 
requirements for moving recipients into job. In New York, counties have discretion in 
designing work requirements and other rules affecting individual behavior. In North 
Carolina, some counties follow a state plan but can make decisions on which services 
are provided to recipients, while some can develop their own plan and define 
eligibility and benefit levels. In Ohio, counties receive block grants and can design 
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their own programs, including services and eligibility for services. In Wisconsin, 
responsibility for welfare devolved to the local level with a competitive bids system. 
In most counties, the county governments administer welfare reform (Gainsbrough 
2003). In sum, although these states have variation in the degree of devolution, 
counties have considerable authority over spending, establishing some aspects of 
policies, and enjoy significant discretion over work requirements, time limits, 
additional benefit eligibility and sanctions (Fording et al 2007).  
Among the thirty-five states that administered AFDC directly, twenty-three states 
continue to administer TANF directly without devolution. Six states give a small 
degree of devolution to the local level, but six states have created local or regional 
advisory boards, usually composed of local government representatives, local 
business representatives, community groups, and service providers rather than 
devolve responsibility to the local governments. These local or regional boards are 
responsible for designing and delivering TANF services. However, these boards often 
represent the local governments which appoint their representatives as members of the 
boards. In Arkansas, transitional employment assistance coalitions composed of local 
departments of human services, business representatives, chambers of commerce, 
service providers, and community development organizations can develop plans for 
funding and implementing welfare programs in their area. In Tennessee, local councils 
which are at least 60% composed of local employers to achieve the goal that training 
programs in each county should be designed to meet the need of the employers in that 
county, can advise on state on welfare reform. In Florida, regional boards are 
responsible for planning and coordinating the delivery of TANF services at the local 
level. They also have authority to determine exemption from work requirements. In 
Michigan, Michigan Works Agencies can use federal funds for services they feel are 
important to their clients. They also have discretion in the use of state funds, and 
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authority to contract with work first providers. In Texas, regional workforce boards 
develop a workforce system that is tailored to local labor market conditions. They also 
can organize and administer training and employment benefits. Like states devolving 
significant authority to counties, though there is variation in the power these boards 
have over TANF policy, they have considerable authority over designing and 
delivering TANF services (Gainsbrough 2003; Fording et al 2007).  
Thus, combining the eight states that devolve significant authority to county 
governments, along with the six states that devolve significant policy discretion to 
regional workforce development boards, there are a total of fourteen states that 
currently devolve significant discretion in TANF implementation to local jurisdictions 
of some kind. These fourteen states are indicated in Figure 1 and are the states that I 
refer to as “SOD states” throughout this paper.  
(Figure 1 about here) 
As can be seen, SOD states are not concentrated in any particular region of the 
country, nor do they appear to be dominated by ideologically conservative or liberal 
states. However, SOD states do tend to be larger states, and include the four largest 
states (in population) among their ranks. 
In their study of SOD in Florida, Fording, Soss and Schram (2007) examine the 
potential punitive effects of SOD by examining local variation in TANF sanctioning 
practices. They find that Florida sanctions TANF clients at a relatively high rate 
compared to other states, although there is considerable variation in sanctioning rates 
across counties. In addition, the local socioeconomic and political environments were 
found to exert strong effects on sanctioning outcomes. The authors attribute both the 
degree of punitiveness in implementation and the variation in implementation 
outcomes to the fact that Florida’s TANF program is characterized by significant 
decentralization, yet this conclusion is merely speculative due to the fact that they do 
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not explicitly examine sanctioning outcomes in other (non-SOD) states. In sum, there 
is good reason to believe that SOD may have a significant effect on TANF 
implementation, but relatively little systematic evidence exists which directly 
examines this question. 
To explore how SOD affects the implementation of welfare policy, I hypothesize 
that SOD will influence the implementation of sanction policy in two ways though the 
increased discretionary power of local administrators and case managers. First, I 
expect SOD states to display greater variation in sanction outcomes than non-SOD 
states. Variation in sanction policy outcomes across counties should be greater 
because SOD gives more room for local administrators and case managers to exercise 
discretionary power, which in turn should be shaped by local environments in the 
implementation of sanction policy. This increased slack for the use of discretion will 
produce more variation in sanction policy outcomes across counties and result in 
stronger effects of local contexts on the implementation of sanction policy in counties 
within SOD states than in those within centralized states.  
Second, I expect that SOD states will have higher sanction rates, on average, than 
non-SOD states. I expect this to be the case for several reasons. Political pressure and 
competition among counties may cause SOD counties to implement sanctions more 
strictly to avoid the immigration of the poor and the loss of business and important tax 
revenue. Hence, counties in SOD states are expected to produce more severe policy 
outcomes through the discretionary power of local administrators and case managers 
than counties in centralized states. Counties in some SOD states also receive block 
grants from the state and have authority to design important aspects of their welfare 
programs, including work requirements, time limits and sanctions. The use of block 
grants may exert pressure on welfare spending because the county must pay 100% of 
each dollar of welfare costs beyond the state contribution (Brueckner, 2000). In this 
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way, block grants may impose a financial burden for counties because counties are 
responsible for all spending when welfare recipients increase beyond some point. 
Hence, counties with SOD are likely to establish tougher TANF policies and 
implement policies more strictly to remove this potential financial burden.  
In summary, due to the nature of welfare services, local administrators and case 
managers have significant discretion in their decision making, which should result in 
significant variation across local areas in sanction implementation. In addition, I 
expect that the impact of local characteristics on the implementation of sanctions 
(through the discretion of local administrators and case managers) will be stronger 
within SOD states than within non-SOD states because second-order devolution 
allows local governments or local boards to enjoy increased discretion over the 
implementation of welfare policies. Finally, I expect that counties in SOD states will 
produce stricter sanction outcomes than counties in centralized states do due to 
political pressure, financial pressure, and competition among counties.  
 
III. Determinants of Discretion of Local Administrators and Case Managers 
What factors should affect how the discretion of local administrators and case 
managers is used in the implementation process? Street-level bureaucrats occupy a 
unique position because they serve as brokers between the organization and clients. 
They translate the rules and deliver services to clients (Scott 1997), and as mentioned 
earlier, they exercise a great amount of discretion. What shapes their use of 
discretion? Schneider and Jacoby (1996) suggest four factors which affect 
bureaucratic decisions at the state level: elected political leaders, interest groups, 
structural influences, and environmental conditions. Among these, structural 
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influences are divided into two categories - the incremental nature of policy making 
and the division of responsibility (devolution) 15 . With respect to street-level 
bureaucrats, many studies of the factors affecting discretion in street-level 
bureaucracies suggest three sets of variables: characteristics of clients, organizational 
characteristics and characteristics of service providers (Scott 1997). In addition to 
these factors, the environments (community characteristics) in which they work are 
often assumed to shape the use of discretion (Weissert 1994; Keiser and Soss 1998; 
Keiser 1999; Keiser et al 2004; Fording et al 2006)16.  
(Figure 2 about here) 
Summarizing these studies, the factors influencing the use of discretion can be 
collapsed into three categories:  
• (1) the characteristics of social street-level bureaucrats themselves who carry 
out a policy,  
• (2) the characteristics of clients which might influence client behavior, and  
• (3) the environment in which social street-level bureaucrats exercise their 
discretion.  
As mentioned earlier, second-order devolution is also an important factor 
influencing discretion (Schneider and Jacoby, 1996, Gainsbrough, 2003; Fording et al, 
2006; 2007). 
In my analyses, I consider all of these factors. In my analyses of TANF work 
 
                                                                                                                                  
15Incremental nature of policy making implies that bureaucrats make decision 
based on what they used to do. Devolution influences the degree of discretion they 
can exercise in their decision making (Schneider and Jacoby, 1996). 
 
16 Client behavior and environment of the county are important factors influencing 
the decisions of bureaucrats (Weissert 1994; Riccucci 2005). 
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sanction, I assume that the initiation of a sanction is a function of both bureaucratic 
discretion as well as client behavior. As I cannot observe the exercise of discretion 
directly, I assume that it is shaped by the environments in which street level 
bureaucrats work. As well, although I cannot observe client behavior directly, I 
assume that client behavior is influenced by various characteristics of clients which 
previous research has determined might lead to a sanction. It is important to clarify 
here that I do not measure bureaucratic discretion of social street level bureaucrats or 
client behavior directly, but assume that the discretion of street level bureaucrats is 
shaped by the environments in which they work. In other words, the question directly 
examined here is how local community environments influence the implementation of 
TANF work sanctions through the discretionary power of local administrators and 
case managers, after controlling for the characteristics of clients.  
Theoretically, the basic tenet of this study is that bureaucratic discretion inherently 
influences the implementation of policies. From this tenet, when the characteristics of 
clients and environments of local administrators and case managers vary across 
counties, this variation produces variation in policy outcomes. In addition, the 
existence of SOD due to 1996 welfare reform should influence the use of discretion 
by allowing greater discretion, thus leading to a greater effect of these variables on 
policy outcomes.  
 The first research question I examine is if and how community based 
characteristics influence the implementation of sanction policies in centrally 
administered states through the discretion of local administrators and case managers. 
To answer this question, I examine the variation in sanction outcomes in centralized 
states that administer sanction policies uniformly and directly, utilizing individual-
level data combined with county-level contextual data. The discretion hypothesis 
expects that there will be significant variation in sanctioning outcomes, even in states 
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with a highly centralized administrative structure. This variation is expected to be 
determined in part by the three factors influencing the use of discretion described 
above. 
The second question is how second-order devolution influences the 
implementation of sanction policies through the (presumed) increased discretionary 
power of local administrators and case managers. I examine this question by 
comparing variation in sanctioning outcomes within SOD states to variation in state-
administered states, utilizing individual-level data combined with county-level 
contextual data.  
The effects of second-order devolution are examined in two different ways; by 
testing what I call the sanction variation hypothesis and the sanction stringency 
hypothesis. First, SOD gives more room for local administrators and case managers to 
use their discretion in implementing sanction policies. Hence, the sanction variation 
hypothesis predicts that the effects of community context on sanction outcomes in 
SOD states should be stronger than those in centralized (state-administered) states. 
Second, as explained above, counties in SOD states have more financial and political 
pressure than counties in centralized states, and they compete with one another to 
maximize their regional interests. Hence, they are likely to implement sanctions more 
strictly. Thus, the sanction stringency hypothesis predicts that sanction rates in 
counties in SOD states will be higher than sanction rates in counties in non-SOD 
states. 
After testing these hypotheses at the individual level, I then move to examine the 
effects of SOD on state-level TANF performance by examining the effects of SOD on 
state caseload decline, state work sanction rates, and state employment outcomes. 
First, I hypothesize SOD states will experience greater caseload decline. This is a 
natural implication of the sanction stringency hypothesis presented above (and the 
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employment improvement hypothesis presented below). That is, if SOD results in 
greater rates of employment and sanction exits from TANF by welfare recipients, then 
it naturally follows that SOD states will experience greater caseload decline, all else 
equal. 
As proponents of decentralization argue, local governments better understand the 
needs of their poor population as well as the social and economic environments which 
surround them. Policymakers in SOD states can provide more appropriate services for 
welfare recipients and perhaps modify program requirements in such a way to 
maximize their own community resources. Hence, the increased discretionary power 
granted local administrators and case managers may lead to greater program success 
in SOD states compared to non-SOD states. Although scholars have conceptualized 
TANF program success in a variety of ways, one of the most common outcomes of 
interest is successful job placement. I therefore test what I term the “employment 
improvement hypothesis,” which predicts that SOD states will have higher rates of 
successful welfare exits through employment, higher rates of job retention, and higher 
earnings gains, on average, than non-SOD states.  
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Figure 1. States Relying on Significant Second-Order Devolution in TANF 
Implementation  
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Figure 2. Factors Influencing the Use of Street-Level Bureaucratic Discretion in the 
Implementation of Policy 
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Chapter 3: Background and Literature Review 
 
I. Welfare Reform and Sanctions 
i. Work-Based Welfare Reform 
The most controversial debate concerning welfare policy in recent years has 
focused on how to end dependency on public assistance and encourage welfare 
recipients to leave welfare through self-sufficiency. This emphasis was reflected in the 
creation of the TANF program, which in 1996 replaced the AFDC program as the 
primary federal cash assistance program targeting poor families and children. 
According to the goals of 1996 welfare reform, the main avenue through which 
welfare recipients are to escape welfare dependency is through employment, which is 
supported in the TANF program through work requirements and client participation in 
education and job training programs.  
This emphasis on work is a significant departure from earlier decades. From the 
1930s through the 1960s, AFDC operated based on the notion that the mother’s 
primary “job” should be caring for her children. But public opinion shifted from this 
notion to work-based welfare with increasing public acceptance of working mothers 
(King and Mueser 2005). Since the 1960s, various reforms to AFDC such as the Work 
Incentive program (WIN) of 1967, the Family Support Act (FSA) of 1988, and the 
associated Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) program have been established 
to encourage recipients to enter the workforce. However, WIN and JOBS were largely 
ineffective. Most researchers considered WIN a failure (Guerdon 1978), and JOBS 
had a minimal effect (Morgan and Kickham 1999), with a 30% caseload increase 
from 1989 to 1994 despite the initiation of JOBS program (Edelhoch et al 2000). 
Major program changes in AFDC did not occur until the 1990s when the federal 
government began encouraging states to apply for waivers that gave them discretion 
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to modify their AFDC program to encourage employment. These state-initiated policy 
changes finally resulted in major welfare reform with passage of Personal 
Responsibility Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996.  
  PRWORA of 1996 abolished federal cash assistance and replaced the AFDC 
with the TANF program. This reform resulted in some critical modifications in 
welfare policies, giving states more discretion in designing their cash assistance 
programs. Some of the most significant changes included the replacement of matching 
funds under AFDC with a fixed block grant, and the introduction of work 
requirements, time limits, and the family cap. Perhaps the most important policy 
changes concern requirements that welfare recipients work, or participate in a work-
related activity, to qualify for cash benefits. If welfare recipients fail to comply with 
work requirements, they may be sanctioned by having their benefits reduced or 
terminated. Although sanctions were used prior to welfare reform of 1996, they did 
not play a significant role under the JOBS program because many families were 
exempt from work requirements (Chi-Fang Wu 2004). In addition, sanctions did not 
remove the entire AFDC benefit but instead resulted in a partial benefit loss. When 
the federal government granted waivers of AFDC rules to state governments in the 
early 1990s, some states began to impose full-family sanctions. Under TANF, the 
federal government requires that states reduce or remove the entire welfare benefit if 
recipients fail to comply with work requirements, thus leaving states with the option 
to enforce partial or full-family sanctions. In sum, the role of sanctions increased 
under TANF because recipients are subject to stricter exemption policies, the severity 
of sanctions has increased, and all states use sanctions. The most significant change 
was the requirement that recipients must work or participate in a work-related activity 
regulated by state governments to receive welfare benefits. If they do not meet work 
requirements, they are subject to sanction. 
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ii. Sanction Policy under Welfare Reform 
Although sanctions seem to play a critical role in the implementation of work 
requirements under TANF, they have been used far longer than since the initiation of 
TANF. During the existence of the WIN program, welfare mothers who did not 
comply with work or training requirements were subject to sanctions, but the 
sanctions were not severe and few clients were subject to work requirements (Mead 
1997). The same was true for the JOBS program, as only partial sanctions were 
allowed, and they were imposed only for adults and certain groups of individuals who 
were subject to JOBS participation requirements (Edelhoch et al 2000; Kalil et al 
2002). In brief, sanctions were used for a long time before TANF initiation, but they 
did not play an effective role in moving large numbers of welfare recipients into the 
workforce. 
Under TANF, welfare recipients are required to comply with more stringent work 
requirements, as there is less eligilibility for exemptions or good cause exceptions. In 
addition to wider application of work requirements, non-compliant recipients are 
subject to more severe sanctions (Fording et al 2006). States are permitted to adopt 
one of the following four types of sanctions under TANF: (1) partial: some portion of 
the cash benefit is reduced but clients still receive some portion of benefits; (2) 
gradual full family: some portion of the cash benefit is reduced for non-compliance. If 
the sanctioned client complies before the end of the duration of sanction, their benefits 
are restored, but if they remain non-compliant, they lose the entire benefits; (3) 
immediate full-family: the entire benefit is eliminated for non-compliance; (4) pay-
for-performance: recipients receive assistance only for the hours they participate in 
required work activities. This is similar to the mix of partial and full-family sanctions 
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but the size of benefit is determined by the level of the recipient’s compliance to work 
requirements. Fourteen states have adopted immediate full-family sanctions17, the 
most severe of the four. Families lose the entire cash benefit soon after non-
compliance is recognized. Twenty- seven states have adopted gradual full-family 
sanctions that reduce some portion of benefits at the first incidence of noncompliance 
for a period of one to six months (depending on the state) 18. If the recipient complies 
with requirements, their benefits are restored, but if they remain non-compliant by the 
end of the period, they lose the entire benefit. Only one state, Wisconsin, has adopted 
pay-for-performance sanctions. Nine states and the District of Columbia have adopted 
partial sanctions, the least stringent form of sanctions (Rowe and Giannarelli 2006; 
Meyers et al 2006) 19. As for sanction duration and cure requirements, some states 
impose minimum duration, while some restore benefits with the sanctioned family’s 
immediate compliance. Thirty-four states impose the minimum sanction duration for 
the most severe sanction by requiring recipients to remain in sanction status for a 
minimum period of time from one to twelve months. Nine states remove sanctions 
and restore benefits as soon as the sanctioned family complies with work 
requirements or reapplies for assistance (in the case of a full-family sanction). Most 
states impose more stringent sanctions for repeated non-compliance, and eight states 
 
                                                                                                                                  
 17 Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, 
Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, Wyoming. 
 
 18 Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, 
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin. 
 
 19 Washington, Vermont, Texas, Rohde Island, New York, New Hampshire, 
Missouri, Maine, California.  
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remove eligibility for cash assistance permanently for multiple non-compliance 
(Meyers et al 2006). 
 
iii. The Logic of Sanctions 
Sanctions are imposed when recipients do not comply with program requirements, 
especially work requirements, the most common reason for sanctioning. How do 
sanctions induce welfare recipients’ compliance with work requirements?  
Sanctions give financial incentives for recipients to comply with work 
requirements by removing their benefits when they do not meet those requirements. 
Hence, under the threat of sanction, recipients should be more likely to follow 
program requirements. Yet, this logic works only if we can assume that recipients are 
rational, and controlling for other barriers to compliance.  
The metaphor of “carrots and sticks” is often used to explain the logic of work-
based welfare policy. Governments support recipients by providing childcare 
subsidies, transportation assistance, and an increased Earned Income Tax Credit as 
carrots when they comply with work requirements, while their benefits are reduced or 
removed by sanction as sticks when they do not meet requirements. Thus, sanctions 
are supposed to teach recipients respect for the rules by imposing negative 
conquences for non-compliance (Kaplan 1999). This presumably results in behavioral 
changes among recipients who experience a sanction.  
Another way that sanctions might influence clients’ behavior is that the potential 
loss of benefits may be enough to motivate recipients to comply with requirements 
without even having to experience a sanction (Fein and Lee 1999). These theories of 
the effects of sanctions assume that recipients are rational and have the ability to 
calculate the benefit and cost of the consequences of their behavior. Under this 
assumption, recipients who lose their benefits by sanction will comply with 
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requirements to restore financial benefits if they truly need benefits and those who 
will not comply may have other income sources or they are not truly needy (Kalil et al 
2002).  
But can we assume that (controlling for other barriers to compliance) all or even 
most recipients are rational in the sense that they can calculate the costs and benefits 
of the consequences of their behavior? Even if they are assumed to have enough 
rationality, the question still remains if they have enough knowledge of welfare policy 
as it is currently implemented. Several studies have found that recipients may not 
have full knowledge of their state’s sanction policies and their consequences when the 
requirements are not fulfilled by the recipients (Hasenfeld et al 2004). The latter 
question is closely associated with the implementation of work requirements and 
sanction policy. Further, even if we assume that recipients are rational and have 
enough knowledge on policy details, they are likely to be affected by how local 
administrators and case managers implement sanctions. 
 
 
II. Review of Sanction Studies 
As sanctions became a central feature of the welfare reform of 1996, the number of 
welfare exits due to sanctions increased, which in turn induced concern about the 
effect of sanctions on welfare recipients. The goal of sanction policy is to make 
recipients’ social status more stable by encouraging them to acquire education and 
skills, get a job, retain their job, and finally become independent of welfare and 
achieve self-sufficiency. From this perspective, the goal of sanctions should be to 
encourage welfare recipients’ compliance with work requirements or job training 
programs, and ultimately, to achieve self-sufficiency through permanent employment. 
However, if sanction policies result in welfare exits without self-sufficiency, they do 
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little to further the stated goals of welfare reform.  
In spite of the consensus that sanctions have been one of the most critical policy 
components of welfare reform, they are the least studied (Pavetti, Deer and Hesketh 
2003). Scholars have investigated questions such as the amount of variation in 
sanction rates across states or counties in a state, the number of families sanctioned 
for failure to comply with work requirements, the role of sanctions in caseload decline, 
the individual and family characteristics of sanctioned people, the obstacles to comply 
with work requirements or to find employment, the well-being of sanctioned people, 
and the community-level social, economic and political factors associated with 
implementation of sanctions. 
In studies of sanction rates, different methods are used to calculate the sanction 
rate and this difference makes it hard to understand and compare sanction rates across 
studies20. Sanction rates will be higher when cases are observed over a longer period, 
when the denominator is restricted to closed cases (as compared to all cases), and 
cohorts are observed over a longer period of time. The most accurate measure could 
be the calculation of rates for cohorts of recipients including new entrants and former 
recipients over time because it captures long term recipients as well as new recipients 
that have different risks of being sanctioned (Myers et al 2006).  
So far, studies show that large numbers of families have been sanctioned due to 
noncompliance with program requirements (Pavetti, Deer and Hesketh 2003; Pavetti 
et al 2004). Yet, there is no consensus concerning whether sanction severity is 
associated with caseload decline (Bloom and Winstead 2002). Rector and Youssef 
 
                                                                                                                                  
 20Several calculation methods are used to estimate sanction rates: a percentage of 
caseload sanctioned in a given month; a percentage of all cases sanctioned or closed 
in a given time period; a percentage of all cases in an entering cohort that are 
sanctioned or closed over time (Pavetti et al 2003; Mayers et al 2006). 
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(1999) found severe sanctions and strong work requirements were highly associated 
with caseload decline, while Hofferth et al. (2001) found severe sanctions had no 
relationship with welfare exits. Although previous studies have not presented a clear 
conclusion on the relationship between sanction severity and welfare exits, sanction 
policy has played a critical role in encouraging welfare beneficiaries to participate in 
work-related activities.  
As for the individual and family characteristics of sanctioned clients, numerous 
studies have found that client characteristics are associated with a higher risk of 
receiving sanctions. Studies have identified that lower levels of education and limited 
work experience are positively associated with the risk of being sanctioned. Age of 
clients and age of children are negatively associated with the risk of being 
sanctioned21. Race of clients matters in sanctioning; African-American and Hispanic 
are more likely to be sanctioned than their white counterparts because their education 
level is lower than whites, and they are less likely to have opportunities to get jobs 
than whites.  
The number of children is positively associated with sanctions (Westra and Routry 
2000; Born et al 1999; Brauner and Loprest 1999; Edelhoch et al 2000; Fein and Lee 
1999; Hasenfeld et al 2004; Heidi Goldberg and Liz Schott 2000; Pavetti et al 2004; 
Cherlin et al 2001; Cherlin et al 2002; Koralek 2000; Kalil et al 2002). Several studies 
have also identified marital status22 (Edelhoch et al 2000; Westra and Routley 2000; 
 
                                                                                                                                  
 21However, age of youngest child has positive relationship with the risk of being 
sanctioned because clients who have a child under age one are usually exempt from 
work requirements. 
 
 22Single clients are more likely to be sanctioned than married clients.  
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Korarek 2002; Pavetti et al 2004), longer welfare dependency23 (Fein and Lee 1999; 
Edelhoch et al 2000; Pavetti et al 2003), and a lack of transportation (Fein and Lee 
1999; Cherlin et al 2002; Hasenfeld et al 2004) as being associated with sanctions. 
Cherlin et al (2002) found that clients with communication problems originating from 
a lack of telephones were subject to sanction as a result of missed appointments.  
In addition to these demographic client characteristics and physical and mental 
health problems, the use of hard drugs, exposure to domestic violence, and the 
absence of child care are also associated with sanctions (Pavetti et al 2004; Hasenfeld 
et al 2004; Kalil et al 2002; Cherlin et al 2002). 
Finally, based on studies of the well-being of sanctioned people after they leave 
welfare, the results indicate that sanctioned people are less likely to be employed and 
to have earned income than non-sanctioned families (Westra and Routry 2000; Born 
et al 1999; Brauner and Loprest 1999; Edelhoch et al 2000). Sanctioned families are 
also more likely to experience some material hardships like utility shutoffs, as well as 
the subjective perception that they are experiencing economic hardship (Kalil et al 
2002; Lee et al 2004; Reichman et al 2005). 
Although these studies provide important insights into the individual and family-
level correlates of sanctioning, scholars have paid little attention to the role of 
administrators and case managers who are responsible for implementing sanctions, 
and in turn how their behavior may be affected by the local implementation 
environment. Indeed, only two studies (Keiser et al 2004; Fording et al 2006; Fording 
et al 2007) have investigated the relationships between local economic and social 
 
                                                                                                                                  
 23 Longer time on welfare dependency is associated with higher risk of 
sanctioning. But there has been no consistent conclusion on the relationship between 
the length of welfare dependency and the risk of being sanctioned.  
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conditions, local racial contexts, the local political context, and the implementation of 
sanctions while controlling for clients’ individual characteristics. One studied a state 
(Missouri) in which welfare is state-administered, while the other studied a state 
(Florida) in which welfare administration is devolved to the regional level. Both 
studies found that racial context was associated with the sanction rate, with the risk of 
being sanctioned negatively associated with the size of the minority population. In 
other words, sanctioning was found to be lower in areas with large minority 
populations than in areas with relatively small minority populations. This finding 
supports theories which suggest that the mobilization of political power of minorities 
induces generous policy outcomes. The latter study found variation in local 
sanctioning practices to be strongly tied to local political values, even after controlling 
for individual characteristics in Florida. This finding could be evidence of variation in 
sanction practices that is due to administrative structure (decentralized second-order 
devolution) along with inherent bureaucratic discretion affecting the implementation 
of sanctions (Fording et al 2006; Fording et al 2007). 
In this dissertation, I continue to investigate the individual and family 
characteristics that are associated with sanctioned families, and the obstacles they face 
for compliance using individual-level data. Beyond these traditional determinants of 
sanctions, however, I focus on the role of administrative discretion in the 
implementation of sanctions, and especially how discretion may be influenced by 
such factors as local economic and social conditions, the racial context, political 
ideology, and the mobilization of the poor. In addition to these local environments 
affecting the implementation of sanctions through the discretion of case managers and 
local administrators, I investigate how administrative structure may impact the 
implementation of sanction policy by distinguishing second-order devolution (locally-
administered sanctions) from first-order devolution (state-administered sanctions) 
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using the dataset composed of individual-level data combined with county-level 
context data.  
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Chapter 4: Research Design (Sanction Implementation Study): Individual-Level 
Analysis 
 
I. Intra-State Variation in Sanctioning in Centralized States: The Discretion 
Hypothesis 
i. Case Selection 
To test the discretion hypothesis, I examine the thirty-six states that administer 
TANF directly. The discretion hypothesis predicts that community-based 
characteristics should influence the implementation of sanction policies through the 
discretion of local administrators and case managers. These states offer a good sample 
to explore the use of discretion by local administrators and case managers in the 
implementation of sanction policy because welfare administration in these states is 
relatively centralized at the state level. Thus, compared to many states which adopt 
SOD, there is less room for bureaucratic discretion in the design and implementation 
of sanction policies at the local level. If there exists variation in sanction outcomes in 
these states, it is therefore most likely caused by the exercise of discretion by street-
level bureaucrats due to the nature of their work, or by differences in client behavior. 
Although some of the variation may be random, I expect that bureaucratic discretion 
will be systematically influenced by community conditions to a significant degree 
after controlling for client characteristics which are related to client behavior that 
might lead to a sanction. 
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ii. Statistical Method 
The dataset is composed of individual-level characteristics (micro-level) combined 
with county-level contexts (macro-level). The purpose of this initial analysis is to 
assess the influence of SOD and contextual factors on the probability of a client being 
sanctioned. Therefore, applying standard estimation techniques such as logistic 
regression ignores the multi-level nature of the data. Applying standard estimation 
techniques to multi-level structural data produces exaggerated statistical significance 
for the coefficients of the explanatory variables (especially for macro-level variables) 
by underestimating standard errors of coefficients. This is due to the fact that there are 
multiple micro-level observations per macro-level unit, thus producing correlation 
(dependency) within macro-level units. In other words, observations are not 
independent, violating a basic assumption of regression that errors are independently 
and identically distributed (Luke 2004; Primo et al 2007).  
To deal with this issue, I employ multi-level modeling for this study. Luke (2004) 
states that multi-level modeling is the most appropriate choice when the observations 
in the study are not independent and the errors are likely to be correlated. In this case, 
the level-one errors (individuals) are likely to be correlated within the level-two units 
(counties) because those individuals are being influenced by the same county-level 
factors.  
To test my hypotheses, I use three different statistical approaches designed to 
overcome error clustering: (1) logit with robust (clustered) standard errors, (2) logit 
with fixed effects, and (3) multi-level logistic regression. Stata 8 is used for 
estimation methods 1 and 2, while Hierarchical Linear and Nonlinear Model (HLM 
6.04) estimation is used for multi-level logit regression. Estimation with robust 
standard errors corrects for error correlation across the observations within a cluster, 
but it requires the assumption that observations across clusters are independent. 
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Robust (clustered errors) estimation accounts for a general form of heteroskedasticity 
as well as for any intra-cluster correlation (Primo et al 2007). Thus, the robust 
(clustered) standard error approach could be more suitable for multi-level structural 
data than standard logit regression because it allows intra-cluster correlations, but 
does not allow inter-cluster correlation. State fixed-effects also control for state-by-
state variation in the dependent variable. This approach captures any clustering by 
level-two units because the dummy variables absorb the unique variation among the 
level-2 units and can be operated easily within a standard regression framework. But 
dummy variables are only indicators of level-two unit differences and they do not 
provide information about why the regression regimes for level-2 units are different 
(Steenbergen and Jones 2002). HLM allows me to avoid possible biases associated 
with estimation procedures that ignore the nested nature of multi-level data. HLM 
corrects for potential biases addressed above by estimating separate variance 
structures on each grouping of nested data and then includes these as estimates in the 
macro-level model so the standard errors are unbiased (Hutchison 2007). It also 
allows me to analyze the explanatory power of each level of variables on the 
dependent variable by estimating variance components. 
Standard logit regression is the worst option to be applied to analyze multi-level 
data as it yields biased estimates of standard errors. Robust (clustered) standard error 
estimation seems to have some advantages over HLM in that it requires fewer 
assumptions than HLM, and it works with fewer clusters than HLM (Primo et al 
2007). Fixed-effects estimation also controls for level-two unit variances but does not 
explain why they are different. However, HLM might be the most advanced and 
precise approach, and it corrects for all potential biases addressed above. It also 
provides information on how much of the variation in the dependent variable is 
explained by each-level of variables.  
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I use HLM 6.04 to estimate hierarchical nonlinear models in the analysis 
(Raudenbush, Byrk, and Congdon 2005) because the dependent variable is a 
dichotomous measure and the multi-level models are estimated using logistic 
regression. I apply clustered standard error, fixed-effects and HGLM to analyze the 
hypotheses, and compare the results of different approaches to one another. I think it 
is meaningful to see if different methodological approaches produce differences in 
results, and if so, how the results are different. However, my preferred approach is 
HGLM because I think it is the most suitable statistical approach for multi-level data 
structures, both theoretically and technically. 
 
iii. Data and Hypotheses 
The data for my test of the discretion hypothesis are drawn from several sources. 
Administrative data are acquired from the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, and local contextual data are from several different sources: U.S. Census 
Bureau, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and Bureau of Economic Analysis. The dependent 
variable is dichotomous, and indicates whether an individual client’s TANF case is 
closed due to a work sanction (1), or for some other reason (0)24.  
 
                                                                                                                                  
 24I restrict the analysis to TANF work sanctions as the dependent variable and 
exclude other types of (non-work) sanctions because SOD gives discretion in 
designing work requirement, required work hours and exemptions for work 
requirements which is related to work sanctions as well as in designing sanction 
policies, and I test the sanction stringency hypothesis with the dependent variable, 
TANF work sanction rates, at the state level analysis later. One of the most important 
changes in the 1996 welfare reform is initiation of work requirements across states. 
By considering whether the result of individual-level analysis is identified with that of 
state-level analysis or not, I can reconfirm the impact of SOD on the implementation 
of TANF work sanctions. Of course, SOD allows authority in designing work 
sanctions to local governments and regional boards in a significant degree, not other 
sanctions. 
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I consider only closed cases due to data constraints. There exist two different raw 
administrative datasets which contain information on client characteristics and 
sanction history. One dataset contains state samples of active cases, while the other 
consists of information on closed cases. By definition, the data for active cases 
provide information strictly for partial sanctions (due to the fact that partial sanctions 
do not close the case). The data for closed cases provide information about gradual 
full-family sanctions and immediate full-family sanctions, both of which can result in 
a closed case. It is impossible to integrate the two different datasets as the two 
samples are not really comparable.  Under this data constraint, the dataset of closed 
cases might be the more appropriate dataset to use for an examination of the impact of 
bureaucratic discretion on the implementation of TANF work sanctions. This is due to 
the fact that sixteen states use partial sanctions exclusively, while thirty-four states use 
gradual full-family sanctions or immediate full-family sanctions (as of 2000, which is 
the beginning time point of my analysis). In addition, it is likely that local 
administrators and case managers take the sanction decision more seriously when the 
effect is to close the case25. Thus, the sample consists of closed cases, and excludes 
individuals from several states as follows. First, I exclude individuals from the ten 
states where state policy does not allow for case closure due to work sanctions26. I 
also exclude individuals from four states that did not close welfare cases due to work 
sanctions, even if they have policy rules which allow for closing welfare cases with 
 
                                                                                                                                  
 25 Information about termination of cash assistance with TANF work sanctions is 
available from the State Policy Documentation Project (http://www.spdp.org/). 
 
 26Alaska, Indiana, Maine, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. 
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work sanctions27. I also restrict the sample to clients who are the head of the TANF 
household, as well as a member of eligible family receiving assistance over age 
seventeen because I consider work sanctions which usually apply to adult clients. As 
defined, the sample consists of such individuals in twenty-two centralized (non-SOD) 
states for six years (2000-2005), supplemented with community (county) level data 
identifying the local characteristics affecting the use of discretion in sanction 
implementation. Hence, the final sample consists of 75,735 clients whose welfare case 
was closed due to a work sanction, or some other reason, in twenty-two centralized 
states.  
In this initial analysis, I test the effects of informal discretion on the 
implementation of sanctions in states with a highly centralized TANF program. In 
these states, states TANF sanction policies should be implemented uniformly across 
counties. Thus, if street-level bureaucrats exercise little discretion in the 
implementation of sanctions, there may be little variation in sanction outcomes across 
counties. On the other hand, if street-level bureaucrats exercise significant discretion, 
we may see significant variation in sanction outcomes across counties28. If this is the 
case, how should variation in sanction rates across counties be explained? As 
 
                                                                                                                                  
 27Iowa, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Virginia. 
28 If we assume that sanctioning is a function of bureaucratic discretion as well as 
client behavior, we cannot conclude that significant bureaucratic discretion produces 
more variation in sanction outcomes without controlling for client behavior. Thus, just 
examining variation without controlling for the local environment and client 
characteristics may indicate that more discretion due to devolution produces more 
variation. But this may be incorrect because we do not control for client 
characteristics. Due to this reason, I argue the only way to measure the discretionary 
power of local administrators and case managers is using variance components in 
HLM because it provides information on the explanatory power of the local 
environment on variation in sanctioning after controlling for the explanatory power of 
client characteristics. 
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explained in the previous chapter, I expect the use of discretion to be shaped by the 
local context, and constrained by clients’ attributes. 
 
1) Discretion Hypothesis 
H1: The probability of clients leaving the rolls due to work sanctions will be 
related to characteristics of the local context, including political, social and economic 
characteristics, after controlling for individual (client) characteristics.  
 
This hypothesis will be analyzed through the following equations:  
Logit regression with clustered standard error (county): 
Ln [Pic/1-P ic] = α + β1(Gender)ic + β2(Age)ic + β3(Number of Children)ic +  
β4 (Age of Youngest Child)ic + β5(Marital Status)ic + β6(Education)ic + β7(Black)ic  
+ β8 (Hispanic)ic + β9(Citizenship)ic  + β10(Employment Status)ic  +  
β11(Earned Income)ic + β12(Political Ideology)ic + β13(%Black)ic + 
β14(%Hispanic)ic + β15(Income per capita)ic + β16(Unemployment Rate)ic + 
β17(Poverty Rat)ic + β18(%Highschool Graduate)ic + β19(Lag Caseload)is + 
β20(Unmarried Birth Rate in TANF Families)is + β21(Sanction Severity)is + ε       (1) 
i =individual  
ic =individual in county c  
is=individual in state s  
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Logit regression with State Fixed Effects: 
Ln [Pic/1-P ic] = α + β1(Gender)ic + β2(Age)ic + β3(Number of Children)ic +  
β4 (Age of Youngest Child)ic + β5(Marital Status)ic + β6(Education)ic + β7(Black)ic + 
β8 (Hispanic)ic + β9(Citizenship)ic  + β10(Employment Status)ic  +  
β11(Earned Income)ic + β12(Political Ideology)ic + β13(%Black)ic + 
β14(%Hispanic)ic + β15(Income per capita)ic + β16(Unemployment Rate)ic + 
β17(Poverty Rat)ic + β18(%Highschool Graduate)ic + Dst(1,2……22)          (2) 
i =individual  
ic =individual in county c  
 
Multilevel Logit Regression: 
Level 1: Ln [Pic/1-P ic] = β0 + β1(Gender)ic + β2(Age)ic +  
β3(Number of Children)ic + β4 (Age of Youngest Child)ic + β5(Marital Status)ic + 
β6(Education)ic + β7(Black)ic + β8 (Hispanic)ic + β9(Citizenship)ic  + 
β10(Employment Status)ic  + β11(Earned Income)ic29 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                  
 29The residual parameter variance for level-1 coefficient has been set to zero. The 
assumptions of linearity and normality are not realistic and no transformation can 
make them so in a binary outcome. The use of standard level-1 model in this case 
would be not appropriate for three reasons: “1. there are no restriction on the 
predicted values of the level-1 outcome in the standard HLM. In contrast, the 
predicted value of binary outcome must lie in the interval (0, 1). This constraint gives 
meaning to the effect sizes defined by the model. A nonlinear transformation of the 
predicted value, such as a logit or probit transformation, will satisfy this constraint; 2. 
Given the predicted value of outcome, the level-1 random effect can take on only one 
of two values and, therefore, cannot be normally distributed; 3. The level-1 random 
effect cannot have homogeneous variance. Instead, the variance of this random effect 
depends on the predicted values as specified.” (See Raudenbush and Bryk 2002 291-
296). 
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Level 2: β0c = γ00 + γ1(Political Ideology)c + γ2(%Black)c + γ3(%Hispanic)c + 
γ4(Income per capita)c + γ5(Unemployment Rate)c + γ6(Poverty Rate)c + 
γ7(%Highschool Graduate)c + μ0c                  (3) 
c =county  
 
The dependent variable (Work Sanction) is a dichotomous variable indicating 
whether the family’s case was closed due to a work sanction (1) or for other reasons 
(0) 30. The independent variables comprise individual-level variables indicating client 
characteristics and county-level variables indicating county-community effects. To 
control for individual-level characteristics, I include Gender, Age, Number of 
Children, Age of Youngest Child, Education, Marital Status, Citizenship, 
Employment Status, Earned Income of Client, and Race of Client (black and 
Hispanic). Gender is coded as (0) for male and (1) for female. Age is measured as the 
actual age of clients, in years. The number of children is measured as the number of 
children for each client. Age of youngest child is actual age of youngest child for each 
client, in years. Education of clients is divided into three categories; less than high 
school (0), high school graduate (1) and more than high school graduate (2). Marital 
status is measured as (0) for married and (1) for single. Citizenship is measured as (0) 
 
                                                                                                                                  
 30Other reasons comprise employment and/or excess earnings, marriage, federal 
five-year time limit, child support sanction, teen parent failing to meet school 
attendance requirements, teen parent failing to live in an adult setting, failure to 
finalize an individual responsibility plan, failure to meet individual responsibility plan 
provision or other behavioral requirements, state time limit, if different than federal, 
collection of child support, excess unearned income, excess resources, youngest child 
too old to qualify for assistance, minor child absent from the home for a significant 
time period, failure to appear at eligibility/ redetermination appointment, submit 
required verification materials, and/or cooperate with eligibility requirements, transfer 
to separate state MOE program, and family served by a tribal TANF program, tribal 
new program, family voluntarily closes the case, and other reasons not specified in the 
data. 
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for non-citizen and (1) for citizen. Race of Client is divided into two categories; black 
indicates (0) for non-African-American and (1) for black, and Hispanic indicates (0) 
for non-Hispanic and (1) for Hispanic. Employment status takes on a value of (0) for 
the unemployed and (1) for the employed. Earned income is the amount of earned 
income for the last month on assistance, in dollars.  
Number of Children, Age of Youngest Child, Marital Status, Education, and 
Race of Client (black and Hispanic) are important client characteristics influencing 
sanctioning outcomes (Fein and Lee 1999; Born et al 1999; Brauner and Loprest 
1999; Edelhoch et al 2000; Westra and Routry 2000; Heidi Goldberg and Liz Schott 
2000; Koralek 2000; Cherlin et al 2001; Cherlin et al 2002; Kalil et al 2002; 
Hasenfeld et al 2004; Pavetti et al 2004; Fording et al 2006). Based on previous 
studies, I expect that being female will be associated with a higher probability of 
clients leaving the rolls due to work sanctions because women are less likely to have 
opportunities to find employment. The probability of leaving the rolls due to work 
sanctions should be higher for younger clients, single parents, clients who have more 
children, clients who have less education due to limited education, and clients who are 
black and Hispanic (compared to White).  
The probability of leaving the rolls due to work sanctions should be lower for the 
clients who have a younger child because they are more likely to be exempt from 
work requirements. Clients who are citizens should have a higher probability of 
leaving the rolls due to work sanctions because they are more likely to have 
opportunities to find other sources of support living without assistance than non-
citizens. I expect that clients who are employed will be less likely to leave the rolls 
due to work sanctions than the unemployed because they are more stable in their 
living than the unemployed, are meeting program requirements, and can maintain 
their employment. Maintaining employment is easier than getting a job or attending 
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job training programs. Clients who have more earned income will be less likely to 
leave the rolls due to work sanctions because they are more likely to leave welfare 
through employment and/or excess earnings than through sanctions.  
To control for local community factors, I consider local political, demographic, 
economic, and social environments. Socioeconomic variables, political ideology, 
partisanship and public opinion have been the most significant factors influencing 
welfare policy outcomes at state level (Dawson and Robinson 1963; Hofferbert 1969; 
Jennings 1979; Dye 1979; Plotnick and Winters 1985; Wright, Erikson and Mclver 
1987; Wright, Erikson and Mclver 1989; Brown 1995; Schneider and Jacoby 1996; 
Berry, Rinquist, Fording and Hanson 1998; Burstein 2002; Berrilliaux, Holbrook and 
Langer 2002). Several studies also find that political environments influence policy 
implementation (Wood and Waterman 1993; Keiser et al 2004; Fording et al 2006). At 
the county level, several studies have included these environmental factors in 
multivariate models and have found them to be significantly related to policy 
outcomes (Grubb 1984; Weissert 1994; Keiser et al 2004; Fording et al 2006).  
In this study, Political Ideology is conceptualized based on the traditional liberal-
conservative dimension. Liberal environments are expected to promote more generous 
welfare outcomes through the activities of local administrators and case managers, 
while conservative environments are expected to drive local administrators and case 
managers to implement less generous sanction policies. To capture the effects of 
Political Ideology, I utilize county presidential election data from 2000 to measure the 
share of the vote received by George W. Bush31. I use local presidential election data 
 
                                                                                                                                  
 31Fording et al (2006) build index of a county ideology with 18 ideologically 
relevant constitutional amendments in Florida and found their constructed index to be 
strongly correlated with local partisanship. 
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as an indicator of Political Ideology because it is available across all counties (and 
there is no other measure of political ideology that is available). I expect that the 
probability of clients leaving the rolls due to work sanctions will be higher across 
counties with conservative ideology than across counties with a predominant liberal 
ideology.  
 To capture the effects of racial context on sanction policy outcomes, I include the 
percentage of the black population and the percentage of the Hispanic population in a 
community. Local racial context might affect policy outcomes in two ways. First, the 
increased minority population may provoke antipathy by the white majority and this 
antipathy leads to a decrease in supporting policies that are beneficial for the minority 
(Key 1949; Hero 2001). On the other hand, a minority may use their increased 
political power to produce generous policies for the minority group (Radcliff and Saiz 
1995; Avery and Peffley 2003). Two studies have applied racial context to explain 
variation in sanction policies and both provide evidence suggesting that sanctioning is 
lower in areas where the minority population is large (Keiser et al 2004; Fording et al 
2006). I expect that the probability of clients leaving the rolls due to work sanctions 
will be higher across counties with smaller minority populations, assuming the 
minority political power overwhelms majority antipathy toward the minority group. 
As Key (1949) and Hero (1998) argued, increased minority population may provoke 
antipathy by the white majority and this antipathy leads to a decrease in supporting 
policies that are beneficial for the minority. 
To capture the effects of economic conditions, local employment opportunities, 
and local labor markets, I also consider the effects of local socio-economic conditions 
such as Unemployment Rates, Income per Capita, Poverty Rates and %Highschool 
Graduate of a community. In counties where there are numerous employment 
opportunities and relatively prosperous economic environments, recipients are likely 
 52 
 
to have an easier time finding employment opportunities and will therefore be more 
likely to avoid sanctions imposed for non-compliance for work requirements. In 
counties with higher poverty rates, local administrators and case managers may be 
more sympathetic to TANF recipients because they recognize recipients’ 
environments and understand their need for help (Fording et al 2006). In counties with 
higher Education level (% of high school graduate), people are more likely to 
understand the environment around welfare recipients, and recognize the necessity of 
welfare. %Highschool Graduate should be negatively associated with probability of 
clients leaving the rolls due to work sanctions. I expect that the probability of clients 
leaving the rolls due to work sanctions will be positively associated with 
Unemployment Rates and negatively associated with Income per Capita. Poverty 
Rate should be negatively associated with the probability of clients leaving the rolls 
due to work sanctions. The Poverty Rate hypothesis may be tenuous, however, 
because higher poverty rates may associated with higher demand or eligibility for 
TANF, and therefore this may result in more sanctions due to increased demand or 
eligibility and more stringent sanctioning.  
 
II. The Impact of Decentralization (SOD): The Sanction Variation and 
Stringency Hypotheses (22 centralized states VS. 7 SOD states) 
i. Case Selection  
As mentioned in the preceding sections, thirty-six states do not devolve authority 
and responsibility to local governments, but instead administer TANF policy at the 
state level. In contrast, eight states devolve significant authority and responsibility to 
local governments and six states devolve authority to regional boards composed of 
representatives from local government and private organizations. Thus, these fourteen 
SOD states serve as good cases to explore the impact of second-order devolution 
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(administrative decentralization) on the implementation of TANF policies by 
comparing sanctioning outcomes with the thirty-six states which administer TANF 
programs directly.   
In brief, thirty-six states administer sanction policy uniformly and directly at the 
state level while fourteen states devolve authority and responsibility in designing 
sanctioning policies (including good cause exemptions) to local governments or 
regional boards due to second-order devolution. Hence, these states serve as good 
cases to explore the impacts of SOD on the implementation of sanction policies. 
 
ii. Data and Hypotheses 
Welfare reform in 1996 provides states with an opportunity to devolve authority 
and responsibility in designing and implementing TANF policies to local governments 
or regional boards. As a result, local administrators and case managers receive more 
discretion in SOD states than those in centralized states. Thus, second-order 
devolution may allow local characteristics to affect the implementation of sanctions 
more strongly through the increased discretionary power of local administrators and 
case managers (the sanction variation hypothesis). In addition, SOD may also drive 
local administrators and case managers to implement sanction policy more strictly due 
to financial and political pressures, and competition among counties (the sanction 
stringency hypothesis). To examine how second-order devolution influences the 
implementation of sanction policies, I test each of these hypotheses.  
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1) The Sanction Variation Hypothesis 
 H2: The effects of local community context on the probability of clients leaving 
the rolls due to work sanctions will be greater in states that devolve authority and 
responsibility to local governments or regional boards than in states that administer 
sanction policy directly. 
 
The strategy for the test of this hypothesis is to compare the coefficient estimates 
from the sample of centralized states (described above for the test of the discretion 
hypothesis) to the coefficient estimates for a model that includes the same variables, 
but instead relies on data from SOD states. Thus, to build my SOD sample, I proceed 
in a similar fashion. As before, I limit the sample to closed cases. I also exclude 
individuals from an additional six SOD states whose sanction policies do not allow 
for case closures due to work sanctions32, and one state that does not close welfare 
cases with work sanctions, even though they have policy rules which (seemingly) 
allow for it33. The SOD state sample thus consists of individual-level administrative 
data for TANF clients, each of whom is a head of household, as well as a member of 
the eligible family receiving assistance over age seventeen, for six years (2000-2005). 
I supplement the individual-level data with community-level data identifying the local 
characteristics affecting the use of discretion in sanction implementation. Hence, the 
final sample for the seven additional SOD states is 23,471 clients whose welfare cases 
were closed due to a work sanction, or for other reasons.  
This sanction variation hypothesis will be analyzed by comparing the coefficient 
 
                                                                                                                                  
 32Arkansas, California, New York, Texas, Minnesota and Wisconsin. 
 
 33North Carolina. 
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estimates from equations 1-3 above (i.e. for 22 centralized states) to the corresponding 
estimates from the following equations (for seven SOD states):  
 
Logit Regression with clustered standard error (county): 
Ln [Pic/1-P ic] = α + β1(Gender)ic + β2(Age)ic + β3(Number of Children)ic +  
β4 (Age of Youngest Child)ic + β5(Marital Status)ic + β6(Education)ic + β7(Black)ic + 
β8 (Hispanic)ic + β9(Citizenship)ic  + β10(Employment Status)ic  +  
β11(Earned Income)ic + β12(Political Ideology)ic + β13(%of Black)ic +  
β14(% of Hispanic)ic + β15(Income per capita)ic + β16(Unemployment Rate)ic + 
β17(Poverty Rat)ic + β18(%Highschool Graduate)ic + β19(Lag Caseload)is + 
β20(Unmarried Birth Rate in TANF Families)is + β21(Sanction Severity)is + ε (4) 
i =individual  
ic =individual in county c  
is =individual in state s  
 
Logit Regression with State Fixed Effects: 
Ln [Pic/1-P ic] = α + β1(Gender)ic + β2(Age)ic + β3(Number of Children)ic +  
β4 (Age of Youngest Child)ic + β5(Marital Status)ic + β6(Education)ic + β7(Black)ic + 
β8 (Hispanic)ic + β9(Citizenship)ic  + β10(Employment Status)ic  + β11(Earned 
Income)ic + β12(Political Ideology)ic + β13(%of Black)ic + β14(% of Hispanic)ic + 
β15(Income per capita)ic + β16(Unemployment Rate)ic + β17(Poverty Rat)ic + 
β18(%Highschool Graduate)ic + Dst(1,2……7) + ε                (5) 
i =individual  
ic =individual in county c 
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Multilevel Logit Regression: 
Level 1: Ln [Pic/1-P ic] = β0 + β1(Gender)ic + β2(Age)ic +  
β3(Number of Children)ic + β4 (Age of Youngest Child)ic + β5(Marital Status)ic + 
β6(Education)ic + β7(Black)ic + β8 (Hispanic)ic + β9(Citizenship)ic  + 
β10(Employment Status)ic  + β11(Earned Income)ic 
 
Level 2: β0c = γ00 + γ1(Political Ideology)c + γ2(%of Black)c + γ3(% of Hispanic)c 
+ γ4(Income per capita)c + γ5(Unemployment Rate)c + γ6(Poverty Rate)c + 
γ7(%Highschool Graduate)c + μ0c                                   (6) 
c =county  
 
The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable reflecting whether a client’s case 
is closed due to work sanctions, or for other reasons. The independent variables are 
the same as those used for the discretion hypothesis models (equations 1-3). My 
expectations for the direction of the effects of the variables in equations 4-6 are 
identical to what is anticipated for the discretion hypothesis models. I expect that the 
effects of local community characteristics, especially political ideology and racial 
context, on the probability of client leaving the rolls due to work sanctions will be 
greater in the SOD sample than those in twenty-two centralized states because local 
administrators and case managers in SOD states have more leeway to exercise their 
discretion, which I anticipate will be shaped by local community environments due to 
second-order devolution.  
As explained in my discussion of statistical methods above, one of the benefits of 
multilevel model analysis using HLM is that we can calculate the collective 
explanatory power of each level of independent variables (i.e. individual-level and 
county-level). In other words, we can know that a certain percentage of the variability 
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in the probability of client leaving the rolls due to work sanctions is due to differences 
between counties, while another percentage is due to differences among clients. 
Comparing across different samples, I am therefore able to test an additional 
hypothesis regarding the effect of administrative structure on sanction implementation. 
That is, I expect the relative explanatory power of county-level variables on the 
probability of clients leaving the rolls due to work sanctions to be larger in SOD states 
than that in non-SOD states. 
 
2) The Sanction Stringency Hypothesis 
H3: TANF clients in states with SOD are expected to have a higher probability of 
leaving the rolls due to work sanctions than clients in states with centralized 
administration. 
 
To test the sanction stringency hypothesis, I simply combine the samples for the 
SOD and centralized (non-SOD) states. Thus, the sample is consists of individual-
level administrative data for TANF clients (as described above), supplemented with 
county-level data identifying the local characteristics affecting the use of discretion in 
sanction implementation, for twenty-nine states  (twenty-two centralized states and 
seven SOD states for years 2000-2005). Hence, the final sample consists of 99,206 
clients whose welfare cases closed due to work sanctions or for other reasons in 
twenty-nine states.  
I examine the effect of administrative decentralization on sanction stringency by 
including a dummy variable in the equations below, where 0 = state administered 
sanction policy, and 1 = county or regional board-administered sanction policy (states 
with SOD). This is reflected in the equation below:  
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Multilevel Logit Regression: 
Level 1: Ln [Pic/1-P ic] = β0 + β1(Gender)ic + β2(Age)ic +  
β3(Number of Children)ic + β4 (Age of Youngest Child)ic + β5(Marital Status)ic + 
β6(Education)ic + β7(Black)ic + β8 (Hispanic)ic + β9(Citizenship)ic  + 
β10(Employment Status)ic  + β11(Earned Income)ic 
Level 2: β0c = γ00 + γ1(Political Ideology)c + γ2(%of Black)c + γ3(% of Hispanic)c 
+ γ4(Income per capita)c + γ5(Unemployment Rate)c + γ6(Poverty Rate)c + 
γ7(%Highschool Graduate)c + γ8D(SOD) c  + μ0c                    (7) 
c =county  
 
I expect that counties in SOD states will have higher probability of client leaving 
the rolls due to work sanctions, on average, than counties in non-SOD states because 
local administrators and case managers in those states implement sanction policy 
more strictly with their increased discretionary power due to financial and political 
pressure and competition among counties. 
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Chapter 5: Results 
 
I. Intra-State Variation in Centralized (Non-SOD) States: The Discretion 
Hypothesis 
As I discussed in Chapter 4, I used three different estimation approaches to test the 
discretion hypothesis. These results are presented in Tables 1. Comparing the results, 
there is virtually no difference in the results for individual level characteristics across 
the different estimation methods. Yet, I ultimately rely on the results in Table 2 as the 
preferred model for my multilevel logit regressions because the HLM is the most 
appropriate one when using multilevel structural data to overcome violating classical 
regression assumptions of normality and individual-level error correlation in the same 
context (Luke, 2004). 
(Table 1 is about here) 
I begin by discussing the results presented in Table 1. The directions of coefficients 
for all individual-level characteristics are consistent with the expectations outlined in 
Chapter 4. In addition, all individual-level effects are consistently statistically 
significant except Gender. Gender is statistically significant only in the Logit with 
State Fixed Effect and Robust (Clustered) Standard Error approaches. The probability 
that clients who leave the rolls due to work sanctions instead of for other reasons is 
lower for clients who are older, have higher levels of Earned Income. As the 
Education level of clients increases, the likelihood that clients leave the rolls due to 
work sanctions decreases. As the Age of Youngest Child increases, and the Number of 
Children for clients increases, clients are more likely to leave the rolls due to work 
sanctions. Black and Hispanic clients are more likely to leave the rolls due to work 
sanctions than white clients, Citizens are more likely to leave the rolls due to work 
sanctions than non-citizens, the employed are less likely to leave the rolls due to work 
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sanctions than the unemployed, and single clients are more likely to leave the rolls 
due to work sanctions than married clients. All individual-level results confirm my 
expectations and are generally consistent with previous research.  
As for the effects of county level context, the Poverty Rate matters across all 
different estimation approaches. Other economic factors matter as well, but the effects 
are not consistent across all estimation methods. The results suggest that the racial 
context does not matter, because %black is significant in only one model, 
and %Hispanic is significant in two of three models, but the direction of the effect is 
inconsistent across the two significant models.  
As for the direction of the contextual effects, the Poverty Rate is positively 
associated with the probability that clients who leave the rolls due to work sanctions. 
Higher poverty rates may reflect the fact that more clients are demanding welfare 
assistance and this increased size of the welfare rolls may force case managers to use 
sanctions more strictly to control caseload, and may reflect limited economic 
opportunities for clients. As Income per Capita increases, the probability that clients 
who leave the rolls due to work sanctions increases. This result is inconsistent with 
expectations. As Unemployment Rate increases, the probability that clients who leave 
the rolls due to work sanctions decreases. Local administrators and case managers 
may be more sympathetic to clients in higher unemployment counties because they 
recognize clients’ environment and understand they need help in a high 
unemployment economy. Racial contexts are statistically significant when using the 
Logit with Clustered Standard error and Logit with State Fixed-Effect approaches. 
As %black increases, the probability that clients who leave the rolls due to work 
sanctions decreases for one model (in Logit with State Fixed Effect approach). The 
effect of %Hispanic is inconsistent across different estimation methods. Indeed, the 
effect is negative and significant in the Logit with Clustered Standard error approach, 
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but positive and significant using the Logit with State Fixed-Effect approach. Given 
the lack of significance for several models, as well as the inconsistency in the effects 
for %Hispanic, the results for racial context are largely inconclusive. 
(Table 2 is about here) 
I now discuss the results for the HLM analysis of the discretion hypothesis, the 
results of which are presented in Table 2. The final model is Multilevel Logit 
Regression which is the most appropriate for multilevel structural data analysis.  
In Hierarchical Generalized Linear Models, the variance component estimates are 
difficult to obtain because the results do not routinely show an estimate of the level-1 
variance because it is impossible to estimate both the coefficient and the error 
variances. Therefore, the error variance is always fixed to the same number which is 
π2/3=3.29. This rule is applied to multilevel models too, but only to the level-1 
residuals (Sarkisian 2007). Hence, the explanatory power of level-2 models can be 
calculated as μ0/ (3.29 + μ0). In the discretion hypothesis model reflected in Table 2, 
differences between county level characteristics explain 25.9% of variability in the 
probability of being sanctioned among clients.  
As for the effects of the individual-level variables, all variables are statistically 
significant except for Gender, and the directions of coefficients are consistent with my 
expectations. I begin by discussing the effects of the individual-level variables, 
relying on the odds ratios calculated from the coefficient estimates. As Age of Clients 
increases by one, the odds that one leaves the rolls due to work sanctions instead of 
for other reasons decreases by 2.5%. As clients’ Earned Income increases, the odds 
that one leaves the rolls due to work sanctions decreases by 0.2%. As the Education 
level of clients increases, the odds that one leaves the rolls due to work sanctions 
decreases by 25.8%. As Age of Youngest Child increases by one and the Number of 
Children for clients increases by one, the odds that one leaves the rolls due to work 
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sanctions increases by 5% and 10.5% respectively. Black clients are more likely to 
leave the rolls due to work sanctions than white clients, as the odds of leaving the 
rolls due to work sanctions are 34.6% higher. Hispanic clients are more likely to leave 
the rolls due to work sanctions than whites, with the odds of leaving the rolls due to 
work sanctions increasing by 21.7%. The odds of Citizen leaving the rolls due to work 
sanctions are 40.3% more than non-citizens. The employed are less likely to leave the 
rolls due to work sanctions than the unemployed, with the odds decreasing by 48.5%. 
Finally, the odds that one leaves the rolls due to work sanctions for single clients are 
19% higher than married clients.  
As for contextual variables, Poverty Rate, Income per Capita and Unemployment 
Rate are significant statistically and the directions of those are identified with my 
expectations. As the Poverty Rate increases by 1, the odds that one leaves the rolls 
due to work sanctions increases by 3.1%. As Income per Capita increases by 100 
dollars, the odds that one leaves the rolls due to work sanctions decreases by 0.8%. As 
unemployment increases by 1, the odds that one leaves the rolls due to work sanctions 
decreases by 4.6%. Racial contexts and Political Ideology are not statistically 
significant. 
In summary, concerning contextual effects, economic characteristics and Poverty 
Rate help to explain variation in sanction imposition in centralized states. This result 
supports the discretion hypothesis that the probability of clients leaving the rolls due 
to work sanctions will be related to characteristics of the local context, including 
political, social and economic characteristics, after controlling for individual (client) 
characteristics. Presumably, county economic characteristics and the Poverty Rate 
influence the implementation of work sanctions through the informal discretionary 
power of local administrators and case managers.  
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II. The Impact of SOD: The Sanction Variation and Stringency Hypotheses 
(22 centralized states VS. 7 SOD states) 
i.The Sanction Variation Hypothesis 
I begin by examining the unconditional variation in sanction outcomes. 
Interestingly, I find that there is no significant difference between SOD and non-SOD 
states with respect to the mean and standard deviation of the probability of a client 
leaving the rolls due to work sanctions. One possible reason for this lack of difference 
across the two sets of states may be that SOD simply has no effect implementation. A 
second explanation may be that the increase in local discretion in SOD states actually 
leads to convergence in policy outcomes, as has been argued by proponents of the 
“race to the bottom” thesis in state welfare benefit levels (Peterson and Rom 1989).  
But it is important to remember that this result is based on the unconditional mean and 
standard deviation, and therefore is obtained without controlling for client 
characteristics and the characteristics of local contexts.. At this point, I argue that the 
only way to measure the impact of SOD on the discretionary power of local 
administrators and case managers is to use variance components analysis in HLM 
because it provides information on the explanatory power of the local environment on 
variation in the probability of sanction after controlling for the explanatory power of 
client characteristics. To examine the sanction variation hypothesis, I therefore present 
results for identically-specified models as estimated in Tables 1 and 2, but I now 
estimate the models for clients in SOD states only. The test of the sanction variation 
hypothesis is then achieved by comparing the results in Tables 1 and 2 for centralized 
states to the results presented in Tables 3 and 4 for SOD states.  
These SOD results presented in Tables 3 and 4 reflect the same order of 
presentation as followed in Tables 1 and 2. I begin by discussing the results in Table 3. 
Once again, there is very little difference in the results for individual-level 
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characteristics across different methodological approaches. The directions of 
coefficients for all individual-level characteristics are consistent with expectations, 
and all are statistically significant except for citizenship and marital status. Thus, there 
is little difference in the effects of the individual-level variables across SOD and 
centralized states. 
(Table 3 about here) 
As for county-level contexts, unlike the case for centralized states, the Poverty 
Rate of a community does not matter in work sanction imposition in SOD states, with 
the exception of the Logit with Clustered Standard Error approach. But Income per 
Capita and Racial Contexts do have consistently significant effects on the use of work 
sanctions, but the direction of coefficient of Income per Capita is inconsistent across 
different approaches. The local educational context (%Highschool Graduate) is 
significant in one of the approaches presented on Table 3 (the Logit with stated fixed-
effect model). As the percentage of high school graduate increases, the probability 
that clients who leave the rolls due to work sanctions decreases. As %Black increases 
across communities, the probability that clients who leave the rolls due to work 
sanctions decreases. As %Hispanic increases across communities, the probability that 
clients who leave the rolls due to work sanctions also decreases in the seven SOD 
states. These results may imply that political power due to the mobilization of black 
and Hispanic populations overwhelms the increasing majority antipathy of whites 
toward black and Hispanic interests as the size of these minority populations increases.  
(Table 4 about here) 
I now move to the HGLM results presented in Table 4. The explanatory power of 
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the level-2 model is 46.5%in this model34. Thus, differences between county level 
characteristics explain 45.9% of the variability in the dependent variable in SOD 
states. Compared to that of level-2 model in centralized states (25.9%), the 
explanatory power of county level characteristics is far stronger in SOD states than in 
centralized states.  
The coefficient estimates presented in Table 4 are similar to those for the other 
statistical approaches, but education is statistically significant, income per capita is 
not significant, and the direction of coefficient for %Black is reversed. Based on the 
results, Education, and racial contexts have a significant impact on the use of work 
sanctions in these seven SOD states. As the percentage of high school graduate 
increases by 1, the odds that one leaves the rolls due to work sanctions decreases by 
6.9%. As %Black increases by 1, the odds that one leaves the rolls due to work 
sanctions increases by 4.2%. This result is opposite the result obtained by the other 
approaches. Nevertheless, I place greatest confidence in the results of multilevel logit 
regression because it is the most appropriate method based on statistical theory, as I 
explained in the previous chapter. As %Hispanic increases by 1, the odds that one 
leaves the rolls due to work sanctions decreases by 3.1% in the seven SOD states. 
Together, these results may imply that majority (white) antipathy toward blacks 
overwhelms the mobilization of poltiical power as black population increases, but 
majority (white) antipathy toward Hispanic citizens is relatively weaker than that 
which exists for black citizens. Or, it could be the case that the mobilization power of 
Hispanic citizens overwhelms the majority antipathy toward Hispanics.  
Compared to the results for the twenty-two centralized states, Income per Capita, 
 
                                                                                                                                  
 34μ0/(3.29 + μ0)=46.5 
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Unemployment Rate and Poverty Rate matter in work sanction imposition in twenty- 
two centralized states, while Education, and racial contexts matter in seven SOD 
states35. This result is consistent with what Fording et al (2007) found in their study 
on Florida. That is, racial context influences the implementation of sanction policy 
through the discretion of local administrators and case managers. These results, along 
with the stronger explanatory power of county-level characteristics in SOD states, 
provide some support for the sanction variation hypothesis that the effects of local 
community context on the probability of clients leaving the rolls due to work sanctions 
will be greater in states that devolve authority and responsibility to local governments 
or regional boards than in states that administer sanction policy directly. SOD allows 
more discretionary power to local administrators and case managers by giving 
authority and responsibility in designing TANF policies to local governments, and this 
increased discretionary power, which is shaped by local environments, influences the 
implementation of sanctions more strongly in SOD states than in non-SOD states.  
 
ii.The Sanction Stringency Hypothesis 
The results for my test of the sanction stringency hypothesis are presented in Table 
5. As can be seen, the directions of the effects of the coefficients for all individual-
level characteristics are consistent with expectations, and statistically significant with 
the exception of Citizenship. This is expected given the fact that this sample is 
 
                                                                                                                                  
35 Unfortunately, I cannot compare the relative effects of county characteristics on 
sanctioning between SOD states and non-SOD states because the variables that matter 
in sanctioning are different across non-SOD (Poverty rate, Income per capita and 
unemployment rate) and SOD states (Education, and Racial context). But the variance 
components in HGLM shows that the differences between counties do explain how 
much of the variability in the probability of clients leaving the rolls due to work 
sanctions.  
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identical to the samples used for the analyses presented in Tables 1-4, but pools clients 
across SOD and centralized states into one larger sample. 
(Table 5 about here) 
Single, female, Black, Hispanic, and unemployed clients are more likely to leave 
the rolls due to work sanctions. Clients who have higher Education, Earned Income, 
Age, younger Age of youngest child and fewer numbers of children are less likely to 
leave the rolls due to work sanctions. For county-level characteristics, Income per 
Capita, Unemployment Rate, %Black and Second-Order Devolution variables are all 
statistically significant. As Income per Capita increases by 100 dollars, the odds that 
one leaves the rolls due to work sanctions decreases 0.6%. As the Unemployment 
Rate increases by 1 across counties, the odds that one leaves the rolls due to work 
sanctions decreases by 3.9%. A %Black increases by 1, the odds that one leaves the 
rolls due to work sanctions increases by 0.7%. As we saw in the previous analyses, 
economic characteristics, and Poverty Rate of counties matter in centralized states, 
while Income per Capita, Education and racial contexts matter in SOD states. As for 
the racial context, the direction of the coefficient for %Hispanic is different between 
centralized states and SOD states. Hence, the effect of %Hispanic becomes 
insignificant in the combined sample of 29 states.  
The most theoretically important variable in this analysis is SOD, which indicates 
the presence of SOD in a state. This variable is statistically significant and the 
direction of coefficient is consistent with the expectation. The odds that one leaves the 
rolls due to work sanctions instead of for other reasons are 56.3% higher in SOD 
states than in centralized states. This result lends support to the sanction stringency 
hypothesis, which states that clients in states with SOD are expected to have a higher 
probability of being sanctioned than clients in states with centralized administration. 
Local administrators and case managers in SOD states may therefore implement 
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sanction policy more strictly due to financial and political pressure, along with 
competition among counties, and as facilitated through their increased discretionary 
power. Although I cannot pinpoint the mechanism inducing this stricter sanction 
implementation exactly, SOD may lead to a race to the bottom and may allow people 
in counties would support sanctions to do so. 
 
III. Summary 
In this chapter, I presented the results from the discretion and sanction 
variation/stringency models. For the individual-level variables, nearly all of the results 
are consistent with my expectations (based on previous studies). In addition, there is 
relatively little variation in the strength of the results across different statistical 
approaches.  
As for contextual variables, county-level economic variables and Poverty Rate 
matter in sanction implementation in centralized (non-SOD) states while county-level 
education and racial context matter in SOD states. The explanatory power of county-
level characteristics in SOD states is about twice as strong as that in centralized states. 
Together, these results support both the discretion hypothesis as well as the sanction 
variation hypothesis.  
For the sanction stringency model, the odds that one leaves the rolls due to work  
sanctions (compared to other reasons for exit) in SOD states is about 56 % higher than 
that for clients in centralized states. This result also confirms the sanction stringency 
hypothesis. SOD induces stronger county context effects in the implementation of 
sanction policies through bureaucratic discretionary power as well as stricter sanction 
implementation due to financial and political pressure and competition among 
counties.  
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Table 1: Discretion Hypothesis Model (Clustering and Fixed Effect) 
 Logit with 
Clustered 
Standard Error  
Logit with  
Fixed Effect 
 
Logit with State 
Fixed Effect and  
Clustering  
 
Independent Variable Coefficient(S.E) Coefficient (S.E) Coefficient (S.E) 
Individual-Level 
Characteristics 
     
Age -.025** 
(0.001) 
-.024** 
(0.002) 
-.024** 
(0.002) 
Gender .046 
(0.075) 
 .095 
(0.058) 
 .095** 
(0.065) 
Black .672** 
(0.159) 
 .326** 
(0.036) 
 .326** 
(0.048) 
Hispanic .387** 
(0.106) 
 .199** 
(0.047) 
 .199** 
(0.079) 
Citizenship  .484** 
(0.179) 
 .356** 
(0.106) 
 .356** 
(0.118) 
Employment Status -.386  
(0.237) 
-.687** 
(0.044) 
-.687** 
(0.142) 
Marital Status .150** 
(0.041) 
 .190** 
(0.034) 
 .190** 
(0.040) 
Education` -.143  
(0.090) 
-.295** 
(0.021) 
-.295** 
(0.032) 
Age of Youngest Child  .050** 
(0.003) 
 .049** 
(0.003) 
 .049** 
(0.003) 
Number of Children  .099** 
(0.015) 
 .101** 
(0.011) 
 .101** 
(0.012) 
Earned Income -.001** 
(0.000) 
-.001** 
(0.000) 
-.001** 
(0.000) 
County-Level 
Characteristics 
     
% Highschool Graduate .005  
(0.015) 
 .001  
(0.004) 
 .001  
(0.007) 
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(Table 1 continued) 
Poverty rate .039* 
(0.020) 
.041** 
(0.003) 
 .041** 
(0.007) 
Income Per Capita -.00001 
(0.000) 
.00003** 
(0.000) 
.00003** 
(0.000) 
Unemployment Rate -.0387 
(0.039) 
-.021** 
(0.007) 
-.021  
(0.013)  
Political Ideology .530 
 (1.062) 
.299 
(0.197) 
.299 
(0.381) 
% Black .003  
(0.005) 
-.002*  
(0.001) 
-.002 
 (0.003) 
% Hispanic -.020* 
(0.011) 
.004*  
(0.002) 
.004  
(0.005) 
State-level Characteristics      
Lag_Caseload  .007 
 (0.015) 
   
Unmarried Birthrate -.007** 
(0.002) 
   
Sanction Severity -.0004 
 (0.002) 
   
R squared 0.0841 0.2178 0.2178 
N 75735 75735 75735 
Note: Cell entries are logit regression coefficients, with clustered standard errors in parentheses in 
model 1 and 3. Cell entries are logit regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses in 
model 2. The dependent variable is based on the dichotomous variable, defined as whether a client’s 
case is closed due to work sanctions or other reasons. Sample is 75,735 clients who leave the rolls due 
to work sanctions or other reasons in 927 counties in 22 non-SOD states. ** p<.05, * p<.10 (All tests 
one-tailed) 
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Table 2: Discretion Hypothesis Model (Multilevel Logit Regression) 
 Multilevel Logit 
Independent Variable Coefficient (S.E) Odds Ratio 
Intercept -2.232 
(0.996) 
 
Individual-Level Characteristics    
Age -.024** 
(0.002) 
0.975 
Gender .086 
(0.066) 
1.090 
Black .297** 
(0.048) 
1.346 
Hispanic .196** 
(0.081) 
1.217 
Citizenship .338** 
(0.121) 
1.403 
Employment Status -.662** 
(0.144) 
0.515 
Marital Status .174** 
(0.040) 
1.190 
Education` -.297** 
(0.032) 
0.742 
Age of Youngest Child .049** 
(0.004) 
1.050 
Number of Children .100** 
(0.012) 
1.105 
Earned Income -.001** 
(0.0002) 
0.998 
County-Level Characteristics    
%Highschool Graduate .008 
(0.008) 
1.008 
Poverty rate .031** 
(0.012) 
1.031 
Income Per Capita -.00007** 
(0.0002) 
0.99992 
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(Table 2 continued) 
Unemployment Rate 
 
-.046** 
(0.019) 
0.954 
Political Ideology .364 
(0.496) 
1.440 
% Black .004 
(0.003) 
1.004 
% Hispanic .003 
(0.004) 
1.003 
Variance Component    
μ0 1.15412**  
R 3.29 (fixed)  
Chi-Square/DF 14.51  
N 75735  
Note: Cell entries are restricted maximum likelihood coefficients, with robust standard errors in 
parentheses. The dependent variable is based on the dichotomous variable, defined as whether a client’s 
case is closed due to work sanctions or other reasons. Sample is 75,735 clients who leave the rolls due 
to work sanctions or other reasons in 927 counties in 22 non-SOD states. ** p<.05, * p<.10 (All tests 
one-tailed) 
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Table 3: Sanction Variation Hypothesis (Clustering and Fixed Effect) 
 SOD states 
  Logit with clustered 
S.E (county) 
Logit with 
state fixed effect 
Logit with 
state fixed effect and 
clustered S.E 
(county) 
Independent Variable Coefficient (S.E) Coefficient (S.E) Coefficient (S.E) 
Individual-Level 
Characteristics 
     
Age -.017** 
(0.005) 
-.017** 
(0.003) 
-.017** 
(0.005) 
Gender .179* 
(0.107) 
.250* 
(0.112) 
.205** 
(0.103) 
Black .138* 
 (0.072) 
.135** 
(0.068) 
.135** 
(0.067) 
Hispanic .159*  
(0.093) 
.160*  
(0.083) 
.160*  
(0.085) 
Citizenship -.114  
(0.152) 
-.071  
(0.138) 
-.071  
(0.159) 
Employment Status -.634** 
(0.250) 
-.645** 
(0.101) 
-.645** 
(0.259) 
Marital Status .039  
(0.057) 
.063  
(0.058) 
.063  
(0.057) 
Education` -.126** 
(0.041) 
-.152** 
(0.036) 
-.152** 
(0.038) 
Age of Youngest Child .031** 
(0.007) 
.029** 
(0.006) 
.029** 
(0.007) 
Number of Children .120** 
(0.027) 
.129** 
(0.020) 
.129** 
(0.027) 
Earned Income -.001** 
(0.0002) 
-.001** 
(0.0001) 
-.001** 
(0.0002) 
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(Table 3 continued) 
 
% Highschool Graduate .020  
(0.017) 
-.017* 
(0.009)  
-.017 
(0.013) 
Poverty Rate 0.044* 
(0.025) 
.006  
(0.012) 
.006 
 (0.018) 
Income Per Capita -.00004** 
(0.00001) 
.00002* 
(0.00001) 
.00002* 
(0.00001) 
Unemployment Rate -.072*  
(0.042) 
.026  
(0.025) 
.026  
(0.033) 
Political Ideology -.059  
(0.638) 
.222  
(0.301) 
.222  
(0.342) 
% Black -.023** 
(0.004) 
-.007** 
(0.002) 
-.007** 
(0.003) 
% Hispanic -.007* 
(0.003) 
-.014** 
(0.002) 
-.014** 
(0.002) 
State-Level Characteristics      
Lag_Caseload -.030** 
(0.010) 
   
Unmarried Birthrate -.222** 
(0.021) 
   
Sanction Severity .090** 
(0.007) 
   
R squared 0.2423 0.2577 0.2577 
N 23471 23471 23471 
Note: Cell entries are logit regression coefficients, with clustered standard errors in parentheses in 
model 1 and 3. Cell entries are logit regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses in 
model 2. The dependent variable is based on the dichotomous variable, defined as whether a client’s 
case is closed due to work sanctions or other reasons. Sample is 23,471 clients who leave the rolls due 
to work sanctions or other reasons in 374 counties in 7 SOD states. ** p<.05, * p<.10 (All tests one-
tailed) 
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Table 4: Sanction Variation Hypothesis (Multilevel Logit Regression) 
 SOD states 
  Multilevel Logit 
Independent Variable Coefficient (S.E) Odds Ratio 
Intercept 3.268 
(2.647) 
 
Individual-Level Characteristics    
Age -.016** 
(0.005) 
0.983 
Gender .220** 
(0.103) 
1.246 
Black .114* 
(0.065) 
1.121 
Hispanic .133* 
(0.076) 
1.142 
Citizenship -.086 
(0.151) 
0.916 
Employment Status -.647** 
(0.257) 
0.523 
Marital Status .075 
(0.058) 
1.078 
Education` -.143** 
(0.038) 
0.866 
Age of Youngest Child .028** 
(0.007) 
1.029 
Number of Children .124** 
(0.027) 
1.132 
Earned Income -.001** 
(0.0002) 
0.998 
County-Level Characteristics    
% of high school graduate -.071** 
(0.022) 
0.931 
Poverty Rate 
 
 
 
 
 
-.052 
(0.039) 
0.948 
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(Table 4 continued) 
 
  
Income Per Capita 
 
-.000002 
(0.00004) 
0.99999 
Unemployment Rate -.013 
(0.071) 
0.986 
Political Ideology 1.931 
(1.333) 
6.896 
% Black .041** 
(0.009) 
1.042 
% Hispanic -.031** 
(0.013) 
0.969 
Variance Component    
μ0 2.86667**  
R 3.29 (fixed)  
Chi-Square/DF 12.26  
N 23471  
     
Note: Cell entries are restricted maximum likelihood coefficients, with robust standard errors in 
parentheses. The dependent variable is based on the dichotomous variable, defined as whether a client’s 
case is closed due to work sanctions or other reasons. Sample is 23,471 clients who leave the rolls due 
to work sanctions or other reasons in 374 counties in 7 SOD states. ** p<.05, * p<.10 (All tests one-
tailed) 
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Table 5: Sanction Stringency Hypothesis 
 Multilevel Logit Regression 
Independent Variable Coefficient (S.E) Odds Ratio 
Intercept -1.319  
(0.964) 
 
Individual-Level charicteristics    
Age -.022** 
(0.002) 
0.977 
Gender .120** 
(0.058) 
1.127 
Black .256** 
(0.044) 
1.292 
Hispanic .180** 
(0.064) 
1.197 
Citizenship .173 
(0.117) 
1.189 
Employment Status -.662** 
(0.129) 
0.515 
Marital Status .150** 
(0.035) 
1.162 
Education` -.253** 
(0.029) 
0.776 
Age of Youngest Child .044** 
(0.003) 
1.045 
Number of Children .105** 
(0.011) 
1.110 
Earned Income -.001** 
(0.0002) 
0.998 
County-Level Characteristics    
% of high school graduate -.005 
(0.007) 
0.994 
Poverty Rate .017 
(0.013) 
1.017 
Income Per Capita -.00005** 
(0.00002) 
0.99994 
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(Table 5 continued) 
 
Unemployment Rate -.039* 
(0.020) 
0.961 
Political Ideology .457 
(0.495) 
1.580 
% Black .007** 
(0.003) 
1.007 
% Hispanic -.003 
(0.005) 
0.996 
SOD .446** 
(0.123) 
1.563 
Variance Component    
μ0 1.64388  
R 3.29 (fixed)  
Chi-Square/DF 12.98  
N 99206  
Note: Cell entries are restricted maximum likelihood coefficients, with robust standard errors in 
parentheses. The dependent variable is based on the dichotomous variable, defined as whether a client’s 
case is closed due to work sanctions or other reasons. Sample is 99,206 clients who leave the rolls due 
to work sanctions or other reasons in 1,301 counties in 22 non-SOD and 7 SOD states. ** p<.05, * 
p<.10 (All tests one-tailed) 
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Chapter 6: Extending the Analysis to Other Implementation Outcomes (Caseload 
Decline, Sanction Stringency, Employment Improvement Hypotheses)36 
 
In chapters 4 and 5, I explored the impact of SOD on the implementation of TANF 
work sanctions with individual-level data, combined with county-level data, by testing 
the discretion hypothesis, the sanction variation hypothesis, and the sanction 
stringency hypothesis. I now move to a state-level analysis of TANF implementation. 
By moving to the state level, I am able to strengthen my analysis in two important 
ways. First, individual-level analyses, as I describe below, I can provide an additional 
test of the sanction stringency hypothesis by considering the effect of SOD on a 
different measure for sanction outcomes. Second, I can go beyond sanctioning 
outcomes to examine the impact of SOD on other implementation outcomes within 
the TANF program. And third, by examining other implementation outcomes I can 
include the full set of SOD states in my sample. In the sanction variation and 
stringency models, which are individual-level analyses, I included 22 of 36 
centralized states and 7 of 14 SOD states in my sample because some states use only 
partial sanctions or do not close the case due to a sanction.37  
In this chapter, we examine the impact of SOD on several different implementation 
outcomes to test for the effects of SOD on TANF implementation beyond work 
sanctions with state-level data. We examine the effects of SOD on TANF policy 
success as well as state punitiveness by examining caseload decline, the use of work 
 
                                                                                                                                  
36 This chapter is co-authored with my advisor, Richard C. Fording. 
 
37 I consider clients leaving the welfare in this analysis. Thus, I miss information 
on client who get sanctioned but still on welfare. 
 
 80 
 
sanctions, and several employment-related measures of TANF performance. We also 
examine the direct and indirect impact of SOD on caseload decline by investigating 
the causal paths through which SOD operates to influence caseload decline. Past 
research suggests that SOD may influence the implementation of TANF through the 
increased discretionary power of local administrators and case managers. The key to 
understanding exactly how this discretion may affect TANF outcomes lies in 
identifying the differences between SOD and non-SOD states in the implementation 
environment. The literature on intergovernmental relations suggests there are several 
distinguishing features of SOD which may lead welfare implementation to take a 
different form than non-SOD states. 
The first consideration is the fact that local actors have greater flexibility in 
designing local programs in SOD states. As proponents of decentralization argue, 
local governments better understand the needs of their poor population as well as the 
social and economic environments which surround them. Policymakers in SOD states 
can provide more appropriate services for welfare recipients and perhaps modify 
program requirements in such a way to maximize their community’s resources. Hence, 
the increased discretionary power granted local administrators and case managers may 
lead to greater program success in SOD states compared to non-SOD states. We term 
this potential effect of SOD the “efficiency thesis” and test this hypothesis by 
examining the impact of SOD on several TANF outcomes commonly studied as 
indicators of successful implementation in the TANF literature. 
Critics of decentralization in welfare administration argue that rather than fostering 
program success, SOD is likely to lead to a more punitive approach to TANF 
implementation (Fording, Soss and Schram 2007; Soss, Fording and Schram 2008). 
We refer to this possibility as the “stringency thesis.” This outcome may occur for a 
couple of reasons already discussed in chapter 2.  
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To test for the effects of SOD on TANF implementation, we first examine the 
impact of SOD on caseload decline. Then, we move to an examination of the impact 
of SOD on four different implementation outcomes that influence caseload decline: 
the state work sanction rate (to test the stringency thesis), the rate at which welfare 
clients exit TANF due to employment, the job retention rate among TANF recipients, 
and earnings gains among TANF recipients (to test the efficiency thesis). 
 
I. Caseload Decline Model 
i.Data and Hypothesis 
First, we hypothesize that SOD states will experience greater caseload decline. 
This is a natural implication of both the efficiency thesis and the stringency thesis 
presented above. According to the efficiency thesis, SOD may result in higher rates of 
successful employment exits from TANF by welfare recipients due to the enhanced 
ability of local administrators to tailor implementation styles to local labor markets. If 
this is the case, then it naturally follows that SOD states will experience greater 
caseload decline (all else equal).  
The stringency thesis also leads to a prediction of greater caseload decline under 
SOD, but for very different reasons. According to the stringency thesis, local 
administrators and case managers may have greater incentive to rely on formal policy 
tools, such as sanctions, to discourage current welfare recipients from continuing to 
receive TANF benefits. In addition, if SOD does indeed result in a more punitive style 
of TANF implementation, it is likely to be reflected not just in sanctions, but in the 
inherent use of discretion by frontline welfare staff who rely on other (less formal) 
strategies to discourage TANF receipt. If this is the case, then in addition to the 
indirect effects of SOD on caseload decline predicted by the stringency and efficiency 
hypotheses, we might also expect SOD to have direct and negative impact on the size 
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of the TANF caseload by encouraging welfare exits for other reasons other than 
sanction or employment. We therefore test the “caseload decline hypothesis,” which 
predicts that SOD states will have higher caseload decline, on average, than non-SOD 
states under welfare reform.  
H4:  SOD States are expected to have higher caseload decline than states with 
centralized administration (The Caseload Decline Hypothesis).  
 
We test this hypothesis by utilizing state panel data for forty seven states over the 
period 1980-2003, estimating the coefficients for equation 8 below.38 As we utilize 
state panel data, the model is estimated by relying on panel corrected standard errors 
and includes fixed effects for states and years. 
Welfare Recipient Ratei,t = αi + γt + β1 SODi,t + β2 TANF Eligibility Indexi,t   
+ β3TANF Flexibility Indexi,t + β4 Restrictive Waiveri,t  
+ β5 Earnings Disregard Waiveri,t + β6 Government Ideologyi,t-2  
+ β7 Per Capita Incomei,t-1 + β8 Unemployment Ratei,t-1   
+ β9 State Minimum Wagei,t + β10 Welfare Recipient Ratei,t-1 + εi,t        (8) 
i =state 
t =year 
The dependent variable, Welfare Recipient Rate, is based on the AFDC/TANF 
recipient rate and is measured in two ways.  For our first model, we rely on the 
simple recipient rate, which is calculated as the number of AFDC/TANF cases per 
1000 state population. As an alternative, we also estimate equation 1 using the log of 
the recipient rate as the dependent variable (Blank 2001; Ziliak et al. 2000). As we 
 
                                                                                                                                  
 38We exclude Alaska, Hawaii and Nebraska due to a lack of data for one or more 
variables. 
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describe below, this choice does little to alter our substantive conclusions.  
Our hypothesis of interest concerns the impact of SOD on the welfare caseload. 
We measure SOD using an indicator of significant second-order devolution as defined 
by Gainsborough (2003) and reflected in Figure 1. For the fourteen SOD states, SOD 
is defined as the proportion of the year during which TANF was implemented. 
Consequently, this variable takes on a value of 1 for all state-years during which 
TANF was in place throughout the entire year, a value of 0 for all state-years during 
which AFDC was in place the entire year, and a value between 0 and 1 for state-years 
during which TANF was implemented in mid-year.39 
Although several states devolved some financial responsibilities to counties prior 
to welfare reform, our measurement strategy effectively assumes that SOD is unlikely 
to have had significant caseload effects in the absence of the policy tools (e.g. 
sanctions, time limits, etc.) available to local administrators and frontline staff under 
TANF. Therefore, the remaining thirty-six centralized (i.e. non-SOD) states are coded 
as 0 for the entire period of the analysis. As our model includes state and year fixed-
effects, we are thus able to control for state-specific trends in caseload levels, as well 
as the effects of national forces affecting caseload dynamics in SOD and centralized 
states alike. This lends a quasi-experimental dimension to our design, thus mitigating 
concerns over causality.  
The remainder of equation 1 consists of variables which control for various social, 
economic and political determinants of caseload dynamics (e.g. Blank 1997, 2001; 
Fording 2001; Ziliak et al. 2000). To capture state economic need, we include the 
Unemployment Rate, and state Per Capita Income. For each of these indicators, we 
 
                                                                                                                                  
39 Implementation dates for TANF are provided by Crouse (1999). 
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expect that as the state’s economic health improves, caseload decline should 
accelerate. To control for the state political environment, we include a measure of 
state Government Ideology, as constructed by Berry et al. (1998). Consistent with past 
research on welfare generosity, we expect that government liberalism will have a 
positive effect on the recipient rate. 
We also include several state policy variables which might be expected to 
influence AFDC/TANF caseload dynamics. To control for differences in state 
approaches to welfare reform under TANF, we include two summary measures of 
state TANF policy constructed by Fellowes and Rowe (2004). The TANF Eligibility 
Index is an additive index of 28 separate eligibility policy choices introduced under 
TANF. The index is coded so that higher values reflect more punitive, restrictive 
programs. Thus, we expect this measure to be negatively related to the recipient rate. 
The TANF Flexibility Index is an additive index reflecting 12 state policy choices 
concerning the flexibility of TANF work requirements. For this measure, higher 
values reflect more permissive programs; therefore we expect this variable to be 
positively related to the recipient rate.40 
Although TANF reflected a significant departure from the AFDC program, during 
the early 1990s, many of the reforms implemented under TANF were being 
implemented in states through federally-granted AFDC waivers. While the magnitude 
of their effect has been debated, past studies have consistently found that the 
implementation of AFDC waivers led to a decrease in the caseload (e.g. U.S. Council 
of Economic Advisors 1997; Ziliak et al. 2000). Therefore, we include AFDC 
Restrictive Waivers, which is measured for all states as the cumulative number of 
 
                                                                                                                                  
40  For states in which TANF was implemented mid-year, we multiply the 
eligibility or flexibility score by the proportion of the year that TANF was in place. 
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restrictive AFDC waivers implemented in that state (until the termination of AFDC in 
1996). For our analysis, restrictive waivers include changes to AFDC that (1) limited 
exemptions for work requirements, (2) introduced time limits for welfare receipt, (3) 
strengthened sanctions for violations of program rules, (4) introduced a family cap on 
benefits for children born while in welfare, or (5) strengthened work requirements. 
We also include a separate dummy variable (Earnings Disregard Waiver) for waivers 
designed to strengthen work incentives by increasing the earnings disregard for AFDC 
clients. We expect that restrictive waivers should have a negative effect on the 
caseload, while the effect of earnings disregard waivers should be positive.41 
Finally, we include the State Minimum Wage and a lag of the dependent variable 
(Welfare Recipient Ratei,t-1). The former takes on the value of the state minimum 
wage for state-years in which a state minimum wage is in place, and is equal to the 
federal minimum wage for state-years in which a state minimum wage does not exist. 
This variable is expected to be negatively related to the welfare recipient rate. A lag of 
the dependent variable is included to model dynamics, as we expect that the effects of 
the independent variables may persist through time (e.g. Ziliak, et al. 2000). 
 
ii. Results 
Preliminary tests confirmed that our dependent variable (the AFDC/TANF 
recipient rate) is nonstationary. Indeed, the coefficient for the lagged dependent 
variable is approximately .90 when the model is estimated in levels (results not 
shown). Our concerns were also validated by more formal tests of stationarity 
 
                                                                                                                                  
41 As with our measures of TANF policies, our waiver variables are measured as 
the proportion of the year in which a waiver was implemented. Waiver 
implementation dates are provided by Crouse (1999). 
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designed for panel data.42 To deal with nonstationarity, we follow Ziliak et al. (2000) 
and estimate equation 1 in first-differences. We retain our fixed effects for states and 
years, which in the first-differenced version of the model now account for trends in 
welfare caseloads that are either state-specific or driven by national forces. After 
converting our model to first-differences and adding a lagged dependent variable, the 
estimation period now encompasses the years 1982-2003. 
The coefficient estimates for this modified version of equation 8 are presented in 
Table 6. All coefficient estimates are generated by OLS, with panel corrected standard 
errors in parentheses (Beck and Katz 1995). The coefficients in the second column of 
results are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation. As the dependent variable for 
this model is the log of the recipient rate, these coefficients thus represent the 
expected percentage change in the dependent variable given a one-unit increase in the 
independent variable of interest.  
As expected, caseloads appear to have been greatly affected by economic 
conditions, as both indicators of state economic health (Unemployment Rate, Per 
Capita Income) are significantly related to the welfare recipient rate. Caseload 
dynamics also appear to be sensitive to the state political environment, as Government 
Ideology is positive and significantly related to caseload change, but only when the 
dependent variable is measured as the log of the recipient rate. 
(Table 6 about here) 
The effects of the policy measures are generally significant as well, and in the 
predicted direction. As expected, the implementation of restrictive AFDC waivers had 
a negative impact on the AFDC caseload, confirming the findings of past studies of 
 
                                                                                                                                  
42 We utilize the test introduced by Hadri (2000).  
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caseload decline (Ziliak et al. 2000). The stringency of state TANF policies has also 
had an important effect on caseload dynamics. This is reflected in the effects of TANF 
Eligibility and TANF Flexibility, each of which is found to be statistically significant 
and in the predicted direction. In contrast, neither of the policies designed to increase 
work incentives (Earnings Disregard Waiver and State Minimum Wage) had a 
significant effect on caseload change. However, the coefficients are in the predicted 
direction.  
We now move to the hypothesis of interest – the effect of SOD. Regardless of how 
the dependent variable is measured, we reach the same conclusion – the 
implementation of SOD has had a negative effect on the AFDC/TANF recipient rate, 
thus contributing to a greater degree of caseload decline in SOD states. When we 
examine the simple (unlogged) recipient rate, the estimated effect of SOD is -.749. 
This suggests that holding other variables constant, the implementation of SOD in a 
state resulted in a decrease of .749 in the number of welfare recipients per 1000 state 
residents. When we examine the model which utilizes the logged recipient rate, the 
estimated effect of SOD is -5.701, which translates to a 5.7% reduction in the TANF 
recipient rate. To help put this effect into perspective, based on the results reported in 
Table 6 it would take an increase of approximately 3.5 percentage points in the state 
unemployment rate, or a decrease of nearly $3,000 in a state’s per capita income, to 
produce a decrease in the welfare recipient rate that is equivalent to the decrease that 
is attributed to SOD.  
Of course, the degree of decentralization (i.e. SOD) is only one dimension of 
TANF policy. States were responsible for many other important decisions in designing 
their TANF programs, as reflected in the variation in the eligibility and flexibility 
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indexes included in equation 8.43 Thus, it is difficult to discern the net impact of 
TANF, and the contribution of SOD to that net impact, from a mere visual inspection 
of the results in Table 6. In addition, it is important to remember that the coefficients 
in Table 6 represent the immediate effects of the TANF variables (due to the presence 
of the lagged dependent variable). The total effect is thus significantly larger. We 
therefore present Figure 3, which provides a more detailed picture of the total impact 
of SOD and the TANF program more generally.  
(Figure 3 about here) 
Figure 3 presents the predicted net effect of the implementation of TANF on a 
state’s welfare caseload (based on the results for the logged version of the dependent 
variable in Table 6). The net impact, as we define it, is the sum of the effects of the 
three TANF variables in our model (SOD, TANF Eligibility Index, TANF Flexibility 
Index). We calculate the net impact for three hypothetical states, each of which 
reflects a different approach to welfare reform. A “restrictive” state is defined as a 
state with a flexibility value at the 10th percentile (4) and an eligibility value at the 
90th percentile (19). Examples of such states in our data include Georgia, Oklahoma 
and Wyoming. A “typical state” is defined as a state with a flexibility value at the 50th 
percentile (7) and an eligibility value at the 50th percentile (14). A number of states fit 
this description. Finally, a generous state is defined as a state with a flexibility value 
at the 90th percentile (11) and an eligibility value at the 10th percentile (8). New York, 
Massachusetts and Rhode Island are examples of states which come close to these 
values. For each of these hypothetical states, we calculate the total effect of the 
implementation of TANF (taking into account the effects distributed through the 
 
                                                                                                                                  
43 Descriptive statistics for these variables, as well as all the variables in our 
analyses are provided in the appendix. 
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lagged dependent variable), assuming either SOD or centralized administration. 
The results of this simulation provide some interesting insights into the ultimate 
impact of SOD and the TANF program on the welfare recipient rate. For the 
hypothetical restrictive state, TANF had a statistically significant negative impact on 
the caseload, resulting in either a 26% or 35% decrease in the caseload, depending on 
the state’s choice regarding SOD. For a typical state, the impact of TANF was 
significant and negative (a decrease of 16%) if a state chose SOD, yet the effect of 
TANF was insignificant if a state chose to implement TANF in a centralized fashion. 
For a hypothetical generous state, the implementation of TANF is actually predicted 
to have resulted in an increase in the TANF recipient rate, but even in the case of 
centralized administration the effect is not statistically significant (p = .12).44 In 
summary, this illustration suggests that while SOD states experienced greater caseload 
decline than non-SOD states, the overall impact of the TANF program on the caseload 
varied greatly, depending on a state’s approach to welfare reform. 
 
II. Second-Order Devolution and TANF Implementation 
Based on the preceding analysis, we find strong evidence that SOD has contributed 
to a reduction in welfare caseloads in the welfare reform era. However, recall that 
both the stringency thesis and the efficiency thesis predict that such an effect should 
 
                                                                                                                                  
44 When we replicate Figure 3 using the results from the version of the model 
which uses the unlogged welfare recipient rate, we find a very similar pattern, 
however the positive net effects of TANF on the caseload are statistically significant. 
This is not terribly surprising and suggests that in the absence of strong punitive 
policies, poor families may have been attracted to TANF by the provision of childcare, 
job training, and other supportive services that were more likely to be provided under 
TANF. For an example of such an argument in the context of waivers implementation, 
see Moffitt (1996).  
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exist. Thus, while the caseload analysis suggests that one of these theories may be 
correct, it does little to help determine the causal mechanism underlying the SOD 
effect.  That is, does SOD reduce caseloads due to greater stringency in TANF 
implementation, or does caseload decline result from greater success in moving TANF 
clients into the workforce?  
To answer this question, we move to an analysis of state TANF outcomes. We 
begin with a state-level analysis of TANF sanctioning as measure of implementation 
stringency. Then we estimate the effects of SOD on three measures of TANF 
performance in employment outcomes - employment exits, job retention, and earnings 
gains.  
 
i. The Sanction Stringency Hypothesis 
1) Data and Hypothesis 
We also examine the impact of SOD on four additional TANF implementation 
outcomes which represent different causal paths for the possible effect of SOD on 
caseload reduction. The stringency thesis predicts that under SOD, local TANF 
administrators are more likely to rely on punitive policy tools to reduce TANF 
caseloads. To test this proposition, we examine the impact of SOD on the use of 
TANF work sanctions, which represent one of the most significant punitive policy 
tools available to case managers under welfare reform.  Federal law requires that 
TANF clients be subject to penalties, or sanctions, if they fail to meet TANF work 
participation requirements. States have some flexibility in determining the severity of 
TANF sanctions, and these penalties can range from a minimum of a partial benefit 
reduction for the head of the household, to a temporary cessation of all TANF benefits 
(and optionally Food Stamps) for the entire TANF family.  We test what we term the 
“sanction stringency hypothesis.” which predicts that SOD states will sanction TANF 
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clients at a higher rate than centralized states.  
 
H5: SOD States are expected to have higher sanction rates than states with 
centralized administration (Sanction Stringency Hypothesis). 
 
If SOD influences the implementation of sanctions as expected, sanction rates in 
SOD states should be higher than those in centralized (non-SOD) states. We test this 
hypothesis by estimating the coefficients for equation 9 below. As we utilize state 
panel data, the model is estimated by relying on panel corrected standard errors and a 
GLS correction to overcome autocorrelation across panels. We also include fixed 
effects for years and region (based on the 4-region Census definition). 
 
Sanction rates i,t = α i,t + β1 SOD i,t + β2Sanction Severity i,t +  
β3 Other Sanction Rates i,t + β4 Citizen Ideology i,t + β5 Government ideology i,t +  
β6 Unemployment Rate i,t + β7 Per Capita Income i,t +  β8 Welfare Recipient Rate i,t-1 
+ β9 Unmarried  Birthratei,t +  β10 Non-White Caseload% i,t   + β11 Poverty Rate i,t    
+ ε i,t                                                             (9) 
i =state 
t =year 
 
The dependent variable is the state sanction rate, calculated for each state and year 
as the number of closed cases due to work-related sanctions, divided by the average 
monthly TANF caseload. We use data extracted from the Annual Report to Congress 
from 2000 to 2003. A number of states (Alaska, Arkansas, California, Indiana, Maine, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, Texas, 
Vermont, and Washington) do not terminate a case for for non-compliance with work 
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requirements. In addition, Wisconsin implements a pay-for-performance sanction 
policy (per-hour reduction). Hence, we exclude these states from the analysis as it is 
not possible for sanction exits to occur. We also exclude Oregon due to a lack of 
sanctions data. Thus, we are able to observe thirty three of fifty states over a four year 
period to test the sanction stringency hypothesis.  
We examine the effect of administrative decentralization on sanction stringency by 
using a dummy variable to measure SOD, where (0)= a state administered TANF 
program (centralized), and (1)= a locally administered TANF program with significant 
devolutionary power (states with relatively strong SOD, as described above). If the 
stringency hypothesis is correct, we anticipate that SOD states will have higher 
sanction rates, on average, than centralized states.  
As with our recipient rate model, we include a number of controls. We include 
Sanction Severity as a measure of the state’s sanction policy, as we expect that the 
more severe a state’s sanction policy, the more likely TANF recipients will leave the 
program. This variable is measured as the percentage of the TANF benefit that is 
deducted due after the first instance of non-compliance. We also include Other 
Sanction Rates, which is defined as the sanction rate for violations of other (non-
work-related) TANF rules. These include child support sanctions, sanctions for teen 
parent failing to meet requirements, and sanctions issued for failure to meet an 
individual responsibility plan. Expectation is that as the use of other sanctions 
increases, there will be fewer opportunities to sanction clients for violations of work 
requirements. This is due to the likelihood that recipients who have a high risk to be 
sanctioned due to work-related requirements are also likely to have a high risk to be 
sanctioned due to other reasons. We anticipate that Sanction Severity will be 
positively associated with state sanction rates, while Other Sanction Rates will be 
negatively associated with state sanction rates. 
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We also consider various dimensions of a state’s political, economic, and social 
environments. To capture the effects of political ideology, we once again rely on the 
measures of state Government and Citizen Ideology developed by Berry et al. (1998). 
As both variables are measured so that higher values reflect greater 
liberalism/Democratic strength, we expect that state partisanship and citizen ideology 
will be negatively associated with state sanction rates.   
To capture the effects of race on sanction policy outcomes, we include Non-White 
Caseload%, defined for each state-year as the percentage of the TANF caseload that is 
either black or Hispanic. Past research has shown that racial resentment has played a 
key role in shaping whites’ attitudes toward welfare, and racial resentment of whites 
has been found to influence redistributive policy choices (Gilens 1999; Schram, Soss 
and Fording 2003; Soss et al. 2001). Thus, we expect to find stricter sanction 
implementation in states where non-whites comprise a higher percentage of the TANF 
caseload.  
To control for “paternalistic pressure” (Mead, 1997; Soss et al, 2001; Fellowes and 
Rowe, 2004), we include the Welfare Recipient Rate (lagged on year) and Unmarried 
Birthrate (of TANF recipients). We expect that as paternalistic pressure increases (due 
to rising caseloads and increasing unmarried births), so too will the stringency of 
sanction implementation due to fact that local administrators and case managers are 
under more pressure to achieve the dual goals of decreasing caseloads and the 
unmarried birthrate among TANF families.  
To capture the effects of economic conditions, local employment opportunities and 
local labor markets, we also consider the effects of state Unemployment rates, Per 
Capita income, and state Poverty Rates. In states where there are numerous 
employment opportunities and relatively prosperous economic environments, 
recipients are likely to have an easier time finding work and will therefore be more 
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likely to avoid sanctions imposed for non-compliance for work requirements. Yet, in 
states with higher poverty rates and generally poorer economic health, local 
administrators and case managers may be more sympathetic to TANF recipients 
because they recognize recipients’ environments and understand their need for help 
(Fording, Soss and Schram 2007). Thus, while we expect that state economic 
environments should matter, we have no clear expectation regarding the direction of 
the effect. 
 
2) Results 
The coefficient estimates for equation 9 are presented in Table 7 below. Consistent 
with our expectations, we find that as the percentage of TANF clients that are Black 
or Hispanic (Non-White Caseload%) increases, sanction rates also increase. 
Unexpectedly, the size of the Welfare Recipient Rate is negatively associated with 
sanctions, despite the fact that we measure the caseload in the year prior to the 
observation of the dependent variable. 
(Table 7 about here) 
One explanation for this finding is that during this period, states were not 
experiencing caseload pressures due to unprecedented caseload decline that occurred 
after the passage of PRWORA. Thus, by the early 2000’s, the size of the TANF 
caseload may be more reflective of states with higher numbers of “hard to serve” 
TANF clients who would qualify for an exemption from TANF work requirements, 
and thus be immune from work-related sanctions.  
The use of sanctions for other reasons (Other Sanction Rate) is significantly 
related to a state’s use of work-related sanctions, and in the anticipated (negative) 
direction. Sanction Severity is positively related to the sanction rate as expected, but is 
not significant. Although a stronger sanction policy is more likely to lead to a sanction 
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exit, it may be less likely to be used by case managers due to the anticipated 
consequences for clients. This may serve to diminish the effect, leading to the lack of 
significance we observe in Table 7. As for economic conditions, we find that Per 
Capita Income is negatively related to the sanction rate, while other indicators of state 
economic health (Poverty Rate, Unemployment Rate) are unrelated to sanctions. And 
finally, and most importantly for our purposes, we find strong support for the sanction 
stringency hypothesis. Second-order devolution states display significantly higher 
sanction rates than centralized states, even after controlling for several dimensions of 
state political and socioeconomic environments. Based on the results, the sanction rate 
in SOD states is estimated to be nearly 6 percentage points (5.756) higher in SOD 
states than in centralized states. Given that the mean sanction rate across all state-
years is only 9.49 (with a standard deviation of 12.00), the SOD effect would appear 
to be substantively significant as well.  
 
ii. The Employment Improvement Hypothesis 
1) Data and Hypothesis 
According to the efficiency thesis which implies another path reducing welfare 
caseload, we should expect TANF implementation to be more successful in SOD 
states than in states utilizing a more centralized implementation process. Although 
scholars have conceptualized TANF program success in a variety of ways, by far the 
most common outcome of interest is successful job placement. We therefore test what 
we term the “employment improvement hypothesis,” which predicts that SOD states 
will have higher rates of successful welfare exits through (1) a higher rate of TANF 
exits due to employment, (2) a higher level of job retention for TANF clients, and (3) 
a larger gain in earnings among TANF clients, on average, than non-SOD states.  
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H6: SOD States are expected to experience higher welfare exit rates through 
employment, higher levels of job retention, and larger earnings gains, on average, 
than states with centralized administration (Employment Improvement Hypothesis).  
 
We examine variation in TANF success by testing the employment improvement 
hypotheses. In these models, we examine three dependent variables - the Employment 
Exit Rate, the Job Retention Rate, and the Average Earnings Gain. The Employment 
Exit Rate is measured as the number of welfare exits through employment divided by 
the average monthly TANF caseload (X 100). This data are obtained from the TANF 
Annual Report to Congress and are available for 49 states (excluding Oregon) from 
2000 through 2003. Job Retention Rate is the percentage of employed adult 
recipients in a given performance year who were employed for two consecutive 
quarters and Average Earnings Gain is the rate of change in earnings of employed 
adult recipients who were employed for two consecutive quarters. These data are also 
obtained from the ARC and are available for years 1998 through 200245.  We also 
include fixed effects for years and region (based on the 4-region Census definition). 
For each of these three dependent variables, we estimate the same model, as given 
below in equation 10. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                  
45 Alabama, California, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York and Virginia are 
excluded due to a lack of data. 
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Employment Performance i,t = α i,t + β1 SOD i,t + β2 Sanction Severity i,t  
+ β3Citizen Ideology i,t + β4Government ideology i,t + β5Unemployment Rate i,t  
+ β6Per Capita Income i,t +  β7 Welfare Recipient Rate i,t-1  
+ β8Unmarried Birthratei,t +  β9Non-White Caseload% i,t  + β10Poverty Rate i,t 
+  ε i,t                                           (10) 
i =state 
t =year 
 
The independent variables in the employment performance models are defined as 
above for the sanction stringency model. However, for this model we do not include a 
measure of non-work sanctions. The expectations are as follows. We expect that 
Sanction Severity will be positively related to employment performance because 
stringent sanction policies may provide TANF recipients with greater incentives to 
comply with work requirements, thus improving employment outcomes. We expect 
that the Welfare Recipient Rate will be positively associated with employment 
performance due to increased pressure to decrease the caseload through employment 
in states where the caseload is relatively high. Citizen and Government Ideology are 
expected to be negatively associated with employment performance due to the 
(presumably) less stringent style of welfare implementation in liberal states, which in 
turn may result in longer welfare spells for TANF clients. State economic prosperity 
(as measured by Unemployment Rate, Per Capita Income, and Poverty Rate) is 
expected to be positively associated with employment performance because a robust 
economy provides more opportunities to be employed. Unmarried Birth Rates and 
Non-White Caseload% should be negatively associated with welfare exits through 
employment and job retention rates because single mothers and Black and Hispanic 
clients face greater barriers to successful employment. And finally, TANF programs in 
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SOD states are expected to display superior employment outcomes compared to 
centralized states due to their ability to better match services to client needs.  
 
2) Results 
The coefficient estimates for each of the three measures of employment 
performance are presented in Table 8.  
(Table 8 about here) 
As before, the effects of several control variables confirm to the expectations. For 
example, stricter sanction policies lead to increased performance for two of the three 
employment measures – Employment Exits and the Job Retention. Higher 
percentages of Black and Hispanic clients on welfare lead to lower rates of 
employment exits and lower average earnings gain, but lead to higher job retention 
rates. One possible explanation for this combination of results is that white clients 
may have more opportunities to obtain jobs, increase their earnings, and then finally 
leave welfare through employment. Nonwhite clients, on the other hand, may have 
more difficulty finding good-paying jobs, but once they find a job, may be more likely 
to keep it and stay on TANF, due to either a lack of opportunities for advancement, or 
a greater dependence on the supportive services available through TANF.  
The Welfare Recipient Rate is positively related to the Job Retention Rate (as 
predicted), but as in the model of state sanction rates, the Welfare Recipient Rate 
displays an (unexpected) negative relationship with two measures of employment 
performance – Employment Exits and Average Earnings Gain - despite the fact the 
caseload is measured in the year prior to observation of the dependent variable. As in 
the previous analysis, we attribute this to the lack of caseload pressure due to 
historically declining caseloads, and the likely association between caseload size and 
“hard to serve” TANF recipients. Unmarried Birthrates have no impact on 
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Employment Exit Rates, and Citizen Ideology and state Government Ideology are 
likewise insignificant. Finally, measures of state economic prosperity (income, 
poverty, unemployment) are largely insignificant46.  
Moving to effects of SOD, overall we find moderate support for the employment 
improvement hypothesis. After controlling for several socioeconomic and political 
variables, we find that TANF programs in SOD states display significantly better 
employment outcomes for two of our three measures of performance – Employment 
Exits and Average Earning Gain.  The effect of SOD on Job Retention Rates is 
estimated to be positive (as predicted) and p-value is close to the significant level, 
however the effect is not statistically significant. Thus, it would appear that the 
relationship between SOD and caseload decline can, to some degree, be accounted for 
by each of the competing causal mechanisms outlined above – greater stringency, as 
well as greater efficiency. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                  
46 There could be two reasons resulting in no impact of economic prosperity. First, 
the period of analysis is only four years (welfare exit through employment) and five 
years (job retention rate and earnings gain) due to data availability. There is relatively 
little variation in income per capita and unemployment over this short time period. 
Second, we would still expect variation across states to reflect a relationship between 
TANF employment outcomes and state economic context. But since the model uses 
regional dummy variables, the model is restricted to explaining variation within 
regions. Since state economic conditions tend to be similar within regions, there may 
therefore be little cross-state variation left to explain as well. One way to test for this 
possibility is to drop the regional dummies and see if the economic variables become 
significant as expected. When we do this, income per capita becomes significant in 
welfare exit through employment model and job retention rate model, but the 
direction of coefficient is opposite with our expectation.  
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III. Summary 
Based on the results of caseload decline analysis, we find that decentralization has 
led to a nontrivial reduction in the welfare caseload in SOD states, as predicted by 
both critics and supporters of SOD. This reduction in the caseload appears to be 
driven by different forces. On the one hand, we find that SOD is associated with a 
greater reliance on punitive policy tools in the form of TANF sanctions. Although we 
cannot pinpoint the causal mechanism driving this relationship, this result is 
consistent with either a race to the bottom or fiscal incentives introduced by shifting 
some of the financial responsibility for TANF implementation to the local level.  
At the same time, we also find SOD to be associated with higher levels of success 
for two important TANF employment outcomes - welfare exits due to employment 
and earnings gains among TANF recipients. As these are two of the more important 
goals of TANF, these outcomes are consistent with arguments made by proponents of 
decentralization who argue that SOD should result in more successful implementation. 
However, as with the case of the SOD effect on sanctions, we cannot be entirely 
sure of the causal mechanism underlying this effect. It may well be due to greater 
efficiency in implementation in a decentralized environment, as proponents of SOD 
would claim. Yet, it is also possible that like the sanction effects, the employment and 
earnings effects also result from greater stringency in implementation due to SOD. 
This possibility is mitigated to some extent due to the fact that we directly control for 
both sanction stringency and government ideology in our employment models. 
Nevertheless, the possibility remains and thus additional research is needed to unpack 
the causal linkages between SOD and TANF. 
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Table 6. Effect of Second-Order Devolution on AFDC/TANF Caseload Decline, 1982-
2003 
Independent Variables Change in Per Capita Caseload Change in Per Capita 
Caseload (Logged) 
Welfare Reform Effects   
  Second Order Devolution -0.749** 
(0.207) 
-5.701* 
(2.745) 
  TANF Eligibility Index 
 
-0.054* 
(0.025) 
-1.356** 
(0.340) 
  TANF Flexibility Index 
 
0.146** 
(0.046) 
1.958** 
(0.758) 
  Restrictive Waiver 
 
-0.230** 
(0.054) 
-1.541** 
(0.568) 
  Earnings Disregard Waiver 
 
0.361 
(0.264) 
0.205 
(2.859) 
Control Variables   
  Government Ideology 
 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.049** 
(0.019) 
  Per Capita Income 
 
-0.150** 
(0.068) 
-2.048** 
(0.777) 
  Unemployment Rate 
 
0.211** 
(0.049) 
1.616** 
(0.494) 
  State Minimum Wage 
 
-0.073 
(0.063) 
-0.905 
(0.773) 
  Welfare Recipient Ratet-1 
 
0.409** 
(0.057) 
32.441** 
(8.687) 
R-squared .74 .66 
N 1034 1034 
Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients, with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. The 
dependent variable is the change in the welfare recipient rate, defined as the number of AFDC or TANF 
recipients per 1000 state residents. The coefficients for the logged version of the dependent variable are 
multiplied by 100, so that for each independent variable, the coefficient can be interpreted as the 
expected percentage change in the welfare recipient rate given a one unit increase in the independent 
variable.  Each model includes fixed effects for states and years.        
** p<.01, * p<.05 (All tests one-tailed) 
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Table 7. Effects of Second-Order Devolution on TANF Work Sanctions, 2000-2003 
Independent Variable Sanction Stringency 
Second Order Devolution 
 
5.756** 
(2.708) 
-0.200** 
(0.083) 
0.094 
(0.070) 
-0.007 
(0.033) 
0.044 
(0.029) 
0.137** 
(0.045) 
-0.378** 
(0.092) 
-1.302 
(0.979) 
-0.001** 
(0.000) 
0.166 
(0.372) 
0.029 
(0.034) 
.19 
132 
Other Sanctions 
 
Citizen Ideology 
 
Government Ideology 
 
Sanction Severity 
 
Non-White 
 
Caseload (t-1) 
 
Unemployment Rate 
  
Per Capita Income 
 
Poverty Rate 
 
Unmarried Birth Rate 
 
R-Squared 
N 
Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients, with panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. The 
dependent variable is based on the welfare exit rate due to work sanction, defined as the number of 
closed family cases due to work related sanction divided by the number of average monthly TANF 
families. The model includes fixed effects for regions and years. 
** p<.05(All tests one-tailed) 
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Table 8. Effects of Second-Order Devolution on TANF Employment Outcome 
Independent Variable Employment 
Improvement, 
2000-2003 
Job  
Retention, 
1998-2002 
Earnings 
Gain,     
1998-2002 
Second Order Devolution   2.877*  
(1.504) 
2.597 
(1.793) 
 3.179**  
(1.482) 
Citizen Ideology   0.012  
(0.091) 
0.006  
(0.069) 
-0.080  
(0.061) 
Government Ideology   -0.068  
(0.042) 
0.040  
(0.036) 
-0.034  
(0.026) 
Sanction Severity     0.083**  
(0.020) 
 0.044**   
 (0.020) 
-0.0009  
(0.015) 
Non-White      -0.080**  
(0.033) 
0.062*  
(0.034) 
-0.041  
(0.052) 
Caseload (t-1)      -0.328**  
(0.095) 
 0.143**  
(0.072) 
 -0.757**  
(0.079) 
Unemployment Rate    -0.5783  
(0.965) 
-0.921  
(0.748) 
-1.55  
(1.093) 
Per Capita Income    -0.0007*  
(0.000) 
-0.000  
(0.000) 
-0.0001  
(0.000) 
Poverty Rate   0.441  
(0.556) 
-0.117  
(0.209) 
0.328  
(0.425) 
Unmarried Birth Rate   0.037  
(0.038) 
-0.010  
(0.209) 
0.048  
(0.150) 
R-Squared   .36 .86 .40 
N   196 220 220 
Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients, with panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. The 
dependent variable is based on the welfare exit rate through employment rate, defined as the number of 
closed family cases due to employment divided by the number of average monthly TANF families. Job 
retention is the percent of the sum of the unduplicated number of employed adult recipients in each 
quarter of the performance year who were also employed the first and the second subsequent quarters, 
and earnings gain is the rate of change in earnings of employed adult recipients who were employed in 
both an initial and the second subsequent quarter in each of the four quarters of the performance year 
(See TANF Annual Report to Congress-Appendix chapter 5). Each model includes fixed effects for 
regions and years.  
** p<.05, * p<.10 (All tests one-tailed) 
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Figure 3. Predicted Net Effect of TANF on Welfare Caseload, by Different 
Combinations of TANF Policies 
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Note: The vertical axis represents the net effect of the introduction of TANF on the welfare caseload, 
expressed as the percentage change in the caseload (based on the second column of results in Table 6). 
The predicted effect is the total effect, and reflects the effects of TANF as they are distributed through 
time (through the lagged dependent variable). A restrictive state is defined as a state with a flexibility 
value at the 10th percentile (4) and an eligibility value at the 90th percentile (19). A typical state is 
defined as a state with a flexibility value at the 50th percentile (7) and an eligibility value at the 50th 
percentile (14).  A generous state is defined as a state with a flexibility value at the 90th percentile (11) 
and an eligibility value at the 10th percentile (8).  
*p < .05, **p < .01 
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Chapter 7: Discussion and Conclusion 
 
For many years now, scholars and policymakers alike have debated the proper 
degree of decentralization (versus centralization) in the provision of welfare benefits 
and services. Many scholars have studied first-order devolution, which is defined as a 
transfer of authority and responsibility in designing and implementing welfare 
policies from the federal government to state governments. Yet, only a few studies 
have been executed to study the impact of SOD on the implementation of welfare 
policies, despite the fact that fourteen states have engaged in second-order devolution 
since the passage of PROWRA in 1996. These studies have focused on how SOD 
increases the discretionary power of local administrators and case managers, how this 
increased discretionary power produces more variation in policy outcomes, and 
whether SOD contributes to policy success or stringency across local jurisdictions. 
However these studies have the limitation of focusing on only a single SOD state. 
There has been no systematic research on the impact of second-order devolution on 
the implementation of welfare policies across states. Hence, it is valuable to know if, 
and how SOD influences the implementation of TANF outcomes by comparing SOD 
states with non-SOD states.  
In this dissertation, I contribute to this literature by conducting several analyses 
which aim to provide greater generalizability concerning the effects of SOD. Based 
on my analyses, individual-level characteristics of clients affect the probability of 
clients leaving the rolls due to work sanctions as previous research has shown. Age, 
gender, marital status, education, employment statues, earned income, race, 
citizenship, the number of children and, the age of youngest child of clients are 
significant factors influencing the probability of clients leaving the rolls due to work 
sanctions. Yet, those characteristics are not only factors determining the probability of 
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being sanctioned. The discretionary power of local administrators and case managers, 
as shaped by community contexts, also plays an important role in the implementation 
of policy even in the centralized states which allow relatively little room for the 
discretionary power that local administrators and case managers execute. The 
probability of leaving the rolls due to work sanctions for clients is the function of their 
individual characteristics as well as the discretionary power of local administrators 
and case managers, which is shaped by local environments. 
Since the passage of PRWORA in 1996 and the subsequent implementation of 
TANF, the practice of second-order devolution under TANF accelerated and allows 
more room for discretionary power to local governments. The adoption of SOD by 
fourteen states thus raised the question of how SOD influences the implementation of 
TANF policies through increased discretionary power of local administrators and case 
managers. I find that county-level economic factors and poverty rates matter in the 
implementation of TANF work sanctions in non-SOD states, while education and 
racial context matter in SOD states. At the same time, the effect of local environments 
on the probability of clients leaving the rolls due to work sanctions in SOD states is 
stronger than that in non-SOD states: the percentage of explained variability in the 
probability of clients leaving the rolls due to work sanctions due to differences 
between counties in SOD states is about twice as large as that in non-SOD states. 
These results imply SOD allows for more discretionary power for local administrators 
and case managers.  
I also find SOD states to have higher sanction rates than non-SOD states. This 
implies that local administrators and case managers implement sanctions more strictly 
with their increased discretionary power, perhaps to avoid the immigration of the poor, 
the loss of business revenue, or increased financial burden. When we consider the fact 
that the migration of the poor across counties is far easier than that across states due to 
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geographical proximity, and the local financial burden and benefit due to block grants 
and bonuses for welfare savings, this finding is conclusive.  
To confirm the impact of SOD on the implementation of TANF work sanctions, 
and examine as well as generalize the potentially beneficial impact of SOD on TANF 
implementation, I test the impact of SOD on caseload decline. I then test the 
stringency (TANF work sanctions), and the efficiency thesis (welfare exits through 
employment, job retention rates, and earnings gain) with state level data. As expected, 
SOD contributes to caseload decline, SOD states have higher sanction rates than non-
SOD states, and SOD states display higher welfare exit rates through employments. In 
summary, SOD contributes to caseload decline indirectly through work sanctions and 
employment exits. SOD may also contribute to caseload decline directly, through 
other less formal mechanisms (such as informal discretion), however, the analyses 
presented here do not allow me to test this possibility.  
As I have shown in the individual level analyses, bureaucratic discretion, as shaped 
by local environments, plays an important role in the implementation of TANF work 
sanctions in addition to client attributes, and SOD increases the impact of 
discretionary power inducing stronger impacts of local environments on the 
implementation of TANF work sanctions. This study therefore contributes to the 
literature on bureaucratic discretion and implementation of policies by suggesting that 
decentralization can lead to greater use of local bureaucratic discretion in the 
implementation of policies in one dimension. 
 In another dimension, as I have shown in individual-level and state-level analysis, 
SOD is also associated with a greater reliance on punitive policy tools in the form of 
TANF sanctions. Although I cannot pinpoint the exact causal mechanism driving this 
relationship, this result is consistent with either a race to the bottom or fiscal 
incentives introduced by shifting some of the financial responsibility for TANF 
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implementation to the local level. This study therefore makes a valuable contribution 
to the literature on the race to the bottom (intergovernmental study) by suggesting that 
decentralization can lead to a race to the bottom not just in policy choice, such as 
benefit levels or other TANF rules, but that it may also have an important impact on 
the implementation of policies.  
At the same time, I also find SOD to be associated with higher levels of welfare 
exits due to employment of TANF recipients. As this is one of the most important 
goals of TANF, this outcome is consistent with arguments made by proponents of 
decentralization who argue that SOD should result in more successful implementation. 
However, I must offer one important caveat to this conclusion. It is important to 
recognize the possibility that employment exits may not necessarily be an appropriate 
measure of TANF success, especially if the jobs in which TANF clients are being 
placed do not provide the income necessary to lift welfare recipients out of poverty. 
Given this possibility, along with our findings concerning the relationship between 
SOD and sanction rates, the effect of SOD on employment exits might simply be 
another manifestation of a race to the bottom.  
Until now, there has been no systematic research testing the impact of SOD on the 
implementation of TANF policies by comparing SOD states with centralized states. I 
applied several different statistical approaches and find few differences in the results 
between different statistical approaches. I use multilevel logit regression with 
individual-level and county-level characteristics in 29 states, and OLS with panel-
corrected standard errors with state-level data in 47 states. This study therefore makes 
a valuable contribution to the intergovernmental relations literature by providing 
important evidence to support the untested arguments by various scholars.  
I find that SOD induces more successful policy outcomes as well as a race to the 
bottom (though increased punitiveness). A race to the bottom is not desirable because 
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it may result in inequitable treatment for clients across jurisdictions, and may not 
reflect the median voter’s preferences for the style of implementation. Regardless, 
SOD (decentralization) may still be a more efficient model of implementation because 
of the beneficial aspects of decentralization. As I show in this dissertation, SOD 
induces more successful employment outcomes and a greater rate of caseload decline. 
This could not be achieved without strict sanction policy as a policy instrument to 
motivate clients to comply with work requirements, attending training programs, and 
finally leave the rolls due to employment. However, the well-being of clients after 
leaving welfare must ultimately be considered in rendering a final judgment 
concerning whether SOD is desirable or undesirable. 
 
Future Research 
While many studies have executed on the impact of first-order devolution on 
welfare policy so far, only a few studies executed on the impact of second-order 
devolution. As I emphasized, this is the first and only systematic study on the impact 
of SOD on policy outcomes by considering most of states. There still left a lot of 
room for SOD to be studied.  
First, this study can be extended by examining the impact of SOD on other 
dependent variables which are outcome of TANF programs. The perception of local 
bureaucrats, poverty rates, caseload, workforce participation for welfare recipients 
(Cho et al 2005; Kelleher and Yackee 2004), TANF work sanctions (Fording et al 
2007), and three employment-related measures have been studied with respect to SOD 
(including my study). All the studies except mine studied a single state. We are able to 
get close to confirm how SOD influences the implementation of welfare policies by 
replicating the analysis with other outcomes across states or in more states, and 
accumulating the volume of studies. 
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Second, it would be useful to investigate other important questions concerning 
SOD, such as why some states have engaged in second-order devolution, and what 
kind of states adopt second-order devolution. My study and the previous studies focus 
on policy impact; how SOD influences policy implementation, whether SOD induces 
more stringency, or SOD also induces more efficiency in the policy implementation. 
All of four studies focus on implementation or evaluation stage of policy process. We 
can extend this restriction by focusing on the initial stage of policy process. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Definition and Sources for Variables used in Discretion Hypothesis, 
Sanction Variation and Stringency Model 
Independent Variables Definition and Sources 
Individual Characteristics 
Gender  
Age 
The number of children 
Age of Youngest Child 
Marital status 
 
Race 
 
Education  
 
 
Employment status 
Citizenship 
Earned Income 
Administrative data from HHS department 
0=male, 1=female 
client age (in years) 
number of children 
age of youngest child 
0=married, 1=single (divorced and widowed are considered as 
single) 
Black; 1=black, 0=otherwise 
Hispanic; Hispanic=1, 0=otherwise 
-1=less than high school years 
0=high school graduate 
1=more than high school 
1=employed, 0=otherwise 
1=citizen, 0=otherwise 
the amount of earned income 
Community Characteristics 
Political Ideology 
Local Racial Context 
 
Local Unemployment Rates 
 
Income per Capita 
Poverty Rates 
Education 
SOD (Administrative structure 
dummy) 
 
% of Presidential vote turnout for Bush (Election Archive) 
% of Black population in county of client  
% of Hispanic in county of client (US census bureau, 2000) 
Unemployment rate in a county of client (US bureau of  labor 
statistics, 2002) 
Income per capita in county (US census bureau, 2000) 
County poverty rate (US census bureau, 2002) 
% of high school graduate in county (US census bureau,2000) 
0=counties in a centralized state, 1=counties in SOD states 
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Table A2: Descriptive Statistics for Analyses Presented in Table 1 and 2. 
Independent Variables Mean Std Min Max 
Individual Characteristics 
Gender  
Age 
The number of children 
Age of Youngest Child 
Marital status 
Black 
Hispanic 
Education  
Employment status 
Citizenship 
Earned Income 
 
.93 
29.68 
1.73 
4.42 
.78 
.32 
.13 
.76 
.31 
.97 
237 
 
.23 
8.23 
1.12 
4.41 
.41 
.47 
.34 
.64 
.46 
.16 
465 
 
0 
18 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
1 
87 
12 
17 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
5000 
Community Characteristics 
Political Ideology 
Black Pct 
Hispanic Pct 
Local Unemployment Rates 
Income per Capita 
Poverty Rates 
Education 
 
.58 
14.04 
5.14 
5.25 
16858 
16.78 
76.53 
 
.12 
19.19 
9.76 
2.94 
3942 
7.45 
9.15 
 
.12 
0 
.08 
.7 
7463 
2.5 
49.44 
 
.88 
86.89 
80.76 
27.5 
38350 
51 
96.33 
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Table A3: Descriptive Statistics for Analysis Presented in Table 3 and 4. 
Independent Variables Mean Standard Error Min Max 
Individual Characteristics 
Gender  
Age 
The number of children 
Age of Youngest Child 
Marital status 
Black 
Hispanic 
Education  
Employment status 
Citizenship 
Earned Income 
 
.94 
29.48 
1.76 
4.34 
.77 
.38 
.12 
.75 
.29 
.97 
191 
 
.23 
8.12 
1.16 
4.39 
.41 
.48 
.32 
.65 
.45 
.16 
411 
 
0 
18 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
1 
80 
11 
17 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
4998 
Community Characteristics 
Political Ideology 
Black Pct 
Hispanic Pct 
Local Unemployment Rates 
Income per Capita 
Poverty Rates 
Education 
 
.54 
6.50 
5.20 
4.62 
18632 
13.97 
79.17 
 
.10 
9.78 
8.94 
2.02 
4306 
5.24 
8.40 
 
.14 
0 
.37 
1.1 
10562 
2.9 
51.54 
 
.81 
65.95 
67.89 
13 
35684 
37.9 
96.96 
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Table A4: Descriptive Statistics for Analysis Presented in Table 5. 
Independent Variables Mean Standard Error Min Max 
Individual Characteristics 
Gender  
Age 
The number of children 
Age of Youngest Child 
Marital status 
Black 
Hispanic 
Education  
Employment status 
Citizenship 
Earned Income 
 
.93 
29.63 
1.74 
4.40 
.78 
.34 
.13 
.76 
.31 
.97 
226 
 
.23 
8.21 
1.13 
4.40 
.41 
.47 
.34 
.64 
.46 
.16 
453 
 
0 
18 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
1 
87 
12 
17 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
5000 
Community Characteristics 
Political Ideology 
Black Pct 
Hispanic Pct 
Local Unemployment Rates 
Income per Capita 
Poverty Rates 
Education 
SOD (Administrative structure 
dummy) 
 
.57 
11.87 
5.16 
5.07 
17368 
15.97 
77.29 
.28 
 
.12 
17.36 
9.53 
2.72 
4127 
7.00 
9.02 
.45 
 
.12 
0 
.08 
.7 
7463 
2.5 
49.44 
0 
 
.88 
86.89 
80.76 
27.5 
38305 
51 
96.96 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 115 
 
Table A5. Variable Definitions, Sources, and Descriptive Statistics for Analyses 
Presented in Table 6. 
Variables Definition (Sources) mean  S.D. 
Welfare Recipient 
Rate  
The yearly change in the number of AFDC/TANF cases per 1000 
population. Source: University of Kentucky Center for Poverty 
Research (UKCPR). “State-Level Data of Economic, Political, and 
Transfer-Program Information for 1980-2007.” (www.ukcpr.org)  
-.033 .127 
SOD Significant devolution=1, 0=all other states (see Figure 1). Source: 
Gainsborough (2003).  
.124 .330 
Government Ideology Government liberalism. Source: Berry et al (1998) 49.271 23.643
Per Capita Income State per capita income in 2003 dollars (adjusted for state cost of 
living using state price deflator developed by Berry, Fording and 
Hanson, 2000).  Source for nominal income data:  UKCPR.  
“State-Level Data of Economic, Political, and Transfer-Program 
Information for 1980-2007.” (www.ukcpr.org) 
26.051 3.887 
Unemployment Rate State unemployment rate. Source: UKCPR. “State-Level Data of 
Economic, Political, and Transfer-Program Information for 1980-
2007.” (www.ukcpr.org) 
5.998 2.064 
State  Minimum 
Wage 
For state-years with a state minimum wage, measured as the that 
wage. Coded as the federal minimum wage for all other state-years. 
Source: UKCPR. “State-Level Data of Economic, Political, and 
Transfer-Program Information for 1980-2007.” (www.ukcpr.org) 
4.058 0.962 
AFDC Restrictive 
Waivers, AFDC 
Earnings Disregard 
Waivers 
For each state, the cumulative number of AFDC waivers 
implemented prior to 1997. Source: Gil Crouse, “State 
Implementation of Major Changes to Welfare Policies, 1992 – 
1998.” Office of Human Services Policy 
Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services  
http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/Waiver-Policies99/policy_CEA.htm  
0.145 0.638 
TANF Eligibility 
Index 
Defined in Fellowes and Rowe (2004). Source: Matthew Fellowes. 3.925 6.484 
TANF Flexibility 
Index 
Defined in Fellowes and Rowe (2004). Source: Matthew Fellowes. 2.131 3.617 
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Table A6: Variable Definitions, Sources, and Descriptive Statistics for Analysis 
Presented in Table 7 
Variables Definition (Sources) Mean S.D. Minimum-
Maximu
m 
Sanction Rate Welfare exit rates due to work related 
sanctions= number of closed cases due to 
work-related sanctions divided by average 
monthly TANF caseload*100  (TANF Annual 
Report to Congress) 
9.49 12.00 0-55.80 
Other Sanctions Welfare exit rates due to other sanctions= 
number of cases closed due to other sanctions 
divided by average monthly TANF caseload 
(TANF Annual Report to Congress) 
5.42 11.21 0-70.82 
Caseload Caseload per 1,000 population 
(TANF Annual Report to Congress)\ 
15.52 7.79 1.65-45.61 
Sanction Severity % of reduction in benefits for initial sanction 56.45 38.41 0-100 
Government 
Ideology 
Government liberalism Berry et al (1998) 40.73 26.93 0-97.5 
Citizen Ideology Citizen liberalism Berry et al (1998) 44.97 14.88 8.44-81.37 
SOD 0=Non-SOD,1=SOD (Gainsborough, 2003) 0.24 0.43 0-1 
Non-White 100%-% TANF families that are White 
(TANF Annual Report to Congress) 
61.38 20.94 9.4-88.1 
Unmarried 
Birthrates 
% of all births to unmarried women on TANF 
(TANF Annual Report to Congress) 
66.47 28.87 0-90.6 
Poverty Rates Poverty Rates (U.S. Census Bureau) 11.46 3.02 6.7-19.3 
Unemployment 
Rates 
Unemployment Rates (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics) 
4.66 1.10 2.3-7.1 
Income Per Capita Per capita income (Bureau of Economic 
Analysis) 
29,121 4,832 21005-
42930 
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Table A7: Variable Definitions, Sources, and Descriptive Statistics for Welfare Exit 
Due to Employment Analysis Presented in Table 8 
 
Variables 
 
Definition (Sources) 
 
Mean 
 
S.D. 
Minimum-
Maximum 
Welfare Exits 
through 
Employment 
Welfare exit rates due to 
employment=number of cases 
closed due to employment divided 
by the average monthly TANF 
caseload (TANF Annual Report to 
Congress) 
23.22 14.55 0-66.60 
Caseload Caseload per 1,000 population  
(TANF Annual Report to 
Congress) 
17.98 9.50 1.65-54.04 
Sanction Severity % of reduction in benefits for 
initial sanction  
44.54 36.23 0-100 
Government 
Ideology 
Government liberalism Berry et al 
(1998) 
44.15 26.59 0-97.5 
Citizen Ideology Citizen liberalism Berry et al 
(1998) 
47.11 15.21 8.44-95.84 
SOD 0=Non-SOD,1=SOD 
(Gainsborough, 2003) 
0.28 0.45 0-1 
Non-White 100%-% TANF families that are 
White (TANF Annual Report to 
Congress) 
58.22 22.68 2.5-88.1 
Unmarried 
Birthrates  
% of all births to unmarried 
women on TANF (TANF Annual 
Report to Congress) 
68.60 26.38 0-99.2 
Poverty Rates Poverty Rates (U.S. Census 
Bureau) 
11.36 3.11 4.5-19.8 
Unemployment 
Rates 
Unemployment Rates (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics) 
4.75 1.12 2.3-7.7 
Income Per Capita Per capita income (Bureau of 
Economic Analysis) 
29,409 4,409 21005-42930 
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Table A8: Variable Definitions, Sources, and Descriptive Statistics for Job Retention 
and Earnings Gain Analyses Presented in Table 8 
Variables Definition (Sources) Mean S.D. Minimum-
Maximum 
Job Retention 
 
The percentage of employed adult 
recipients in a given performance 
year who were employed for two 
consecutive quarters. 
65.84 12.13 12.21-88.56 
 
Earnings Gain 
 
 The rate of change in earnings of 
employed adult recipients who 
were employed for two 
consecutive quarters. 
35.60 13.34 3.66-83.21 
Caseload Caseload per 1,000 population  
(TANF Annual Report to 
Congress) 
18.57 9.52 1.65-55.08 
Sanction Severity % of reduction in benefits for 
initial sanction  
43.40 36.00 0-100 
Government 
Ideology 
Government liberalism Berry et al 
(1998) 
43.49 26.77 0-97.91 
Citizen Ideology Citizen liberalism Berry et al 
(1998) 
48.30 15.60 8.44-95.84 
SOD 0=Non-SOD,1=SOD 
(Gainsborough, 2003) 
0.27 0.44 0-1 
Non-White 100%-% TANF families that are 
White (TANF Annual Report to 
Congress) 
55.01 23.99 2.5-88.1 
Unmarried 
Birthrates  
% of all births to unmarried 
women in a state(TANF Annual 
Report to Congress) 
32.35 5.46 16.7-47.1 
Poverty Rates Poverty Rates (U.S. Census 
Bureau) 
11.19 3.00 4.5-19.8 
Unemployment 
Rates 
Unemployment Rates (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics) 
4.41 1.07 2.3-7.7 
Income Per Capita Per capita income (Bureau of 
Economic Analysis) 
27,840 4,365 19,545-42,921 
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